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Abstract
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of real estate price fluctuations. Given the
collapse of US house prices during 2007-2009 along with the simultaneous rise in national unemploy-
ment an thorough understanding of both the housing market and its relation to the labor market
has perhaps never been more important. While this dissertation fits in the real estate finance lit-
erature, my broader purpose is to use to new micro-level data to empirically test the relevance of
financial and macroeconomic theories. Chapter 2 offers evidence that small firms borrow against
real estate holdings to pay employment and this collateral channel is responsible for 8-16% of the
total decline in employment between 2007-2009. Chapter 3 develops the locally-weighted repeat
sales technique, a new econometric estimation to price any real estate property by comparing the
house to all properties on the market. We then apply the method to the US Housing Market and
find that traditional aggregate house indices such as Case-Shiller have overestimated the bubble by
10%. Chapter 4 uses new data on small firm financials to exhibit that home equity is a significant
source of initial financing for large startups: specifically, in our preferred specification we find that a
100% increase in real estate price growth is responsible for an 11% increase in home equity financing
among all entrepreneurs and a 21% increase for large start-ups.
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1 Introduction
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of real estate price fluctuations. Given the
collapse of US house prices during 2007-2009 along with the simultaneous credit crisis and the rise
in national unemployment I believe that a thorough understanding of both the housing market and
its relation to the financial and macroeconomy has perhaps never been more important. While this
dissertation fits in the real estate finance literature, my broader purpose is to use to new micro-level
data to empirically test the relevance of financial and macroeconomic theories.
My second chapter of my dissertation is titled, How Real Estate Drives the Economy: An
Investigation of Small Firm Collateral Shocks on Employment. The real estate market has been
at the center of the debate on the causes and consequences of the rise in unemployment during
2007-2009, yet the mechanism that links these factors remains inconclusive. We propose a simple
explanation: since small firms are highly dependent on collateral to access external financing, balance
sheet shocks can affect financing availability and impact real outlays. Using UK firm level data we
find that the average small business extracts $0.25 out of every dollar increase in their real estate
value and applies $0.10 for investment and $0.07 for employment expenditures. Our method exploits
cross-sectional differences in exogenous real estate price growth using measures of housing supply
elasticity as well as variation in firm real estate holdings. Our channel directly explains 8-16% of
the decline in national employment during 2007-2009 and as much as 20-37% for areas worst hit
by the housing crisis. The estimates are greatest for both the youngest and smallest firms, and
accounting for general equilibrium effects in a macroeconomic framework appears only to magnify
our result. Our research highlights the small business collateral channel as a relevant explanation
of the recent Great Recession and illustrates business balance sheet shocks as a primary driver of
financial frictions to the economy.
The third chapter of my dissertation is titled, How Case-Shiller got it Wrong: the Effect of
Market Conditions on Price Indices and attempts to extend empirical asset pricing techniques to
the study of the housing market. Assets such as real estate, large transportation equipment, and
luxury artwork sell infrequently and are not interchangable. As a result traditional price indices, such
as the Case-Shiller Index for metropolitan house prices, are the dominant method to measure price
fluctuations of these heterogeneous and illiquid assets. First, we highlight that standard price indices
are biased towards frequently sold assets and can result in significant financial implications. Secondly,
we correct for this mismeasurment by introducing the locally-weighted repeated sales technique, a
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novel estimation procedure for estimating a distinct price index for any asset and then aggregating
assets to define unbiased indices. Our procedure rests on estimating local weights by comparing
a given assets to all similar assets sold that period along a number of observable characteristics.
Third, we highlight advantage of our technique by examining the US housing market. We find that
beginning in 2004 changing credit standards to low income homebuyers resulted in strong price
growth and high turnover in low value housing. As a result a Case-Shiller type index substantially
overstates the peak of the US housing bubble by 10%.
In the fourth and final chapter, titled Do Real Estate Prices Impact Entrepreneurial Financing?
Evidence from the Home Equity Channel, we examine the use of home equity for small businesses
and the effect of real estate price growth on entrepreneurial financing. Using a new micro-level
dataset, we find that during the housing boom one-quarter of large US start-ups depended on home
equity as a source of initial capital. In response to an exogenous shock to real estate price growth,
entrepreneurs increase reliance on home equity financing relative to firms with minimal financing
needs. Simultaneously, these firms decline financing through bank loans while less formal financing
channels appear unaffected. The results are greatest for firms that receive between $50,000, and
$1 million in funding. Specifically, in our preferred specification we find that a 100% increase
in real estate price growth is responsible for an 11% increase in home equity financing among all
entrepreneurs and a 21% increase for large start-ups. Using a simple back of the envelope calculation
we find that 2000-2006 real estate price growth is responsible for at least a 9% increase in the level
of initial funding through the home equity channel.
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2 How Real Estate Drives the Economy: An Investigation of
Small Firm Collateral Shocks on Employment
Introduction
The real estate market has been at the center of the debate on the causes and consequences of the
rise in unemployment during 2007-2009. Recent research has argued that the high level of unem-
ployment is the result of a drop in consumer demand driven by housing shocks to household balance
sheets1. A separate literature highlights the role of toxic real estate assets on bank balance sheets
and the resulting decrease in financial lending2, while still others focus on structural unemployment
relating to the decline of construction spending or house lock3.
To date there has been little attention to the real impacts of the real estate market on the small
business balance sheet. Yet, between 1997 and 2009 the Debt-to-GDP ratio of US noncorporate
firms (i.e sole proprietorships and limited partnerships) grew faster than both household debt and
corporate debt before subsequently declining by 14% during the Financial Crisis4. We relate this
fact to the simultaneous rise and fall of the commercial real estate market give that: (i) 70% of
all commercial and industrial long-term debt and 30-40% of short-term loans in the United States
are secured by collateral assets (Berger and Udell 1990) and (ii) real estate is the primary source of
collateral for small business borrowing (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2013).
With this in mind, our paper evaluates an alternative possible explanation of the rise and fall
in employment over the last decade: the small business collateral channel. We argue that small
financially-constrained firms rely on real estate as a pledgable asset for external financing and that
shocks to the value of this real estate can affect firm labor decisions. Using geographic variation in
real estate shocks, we find that for a $ 1 decrease in the value of real estate the firm actually owns
results in a $ 0.25 decrease in debt and impacts both investment and employment expenditures.
1See Mian and Sufi (2011), Mian and Sufi (2012), Mian, Rao and Sufi (2013), Midrigan and Phillippon (2011),
Eggertson and Krugman (2012), and Guerreiri and Lorenzoni (2011).
2See Chodorow-Reich (2013) and Greenstone and Mas (2013).
3See Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigo (2013) and Karahan and Sree (2013).
4This is not simply a national phenomenon: between 2002 and 2007 UK private firm liabilities increased from
$2,283 billion to $ 3,690 billion, a 62% increase in only five years. During this same period public firms increased
from $124 to $156 billion(a 27% increase), and households increased liabilities increased by 65% from $923 to $1,521
billion. A closer look at the data tells us that this increase is largely driven to an increase in loans. Private firms saw
an incredible 98% increase in loans (from $664 billion to $1,315.5 billion), while households saw a 71% increase (from
$ 847 billion to $1,449 billion).
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After aggregating our results and accounting for equilibrium effects in the macroeconomy we find
that the small business collateral channel is responsible for 8-16% of the total decline in aggregate
employment expenditures. Our work highlights that small firm balance sheet shocks comprise a
viable link between financial frictions and the macroeconomy.
We differentiate between two potential explanations of our results. First, collateral restrictions
on investment can result in a decline in capital and impact employment due to the complementarities
of capital and labor. Alternatively, if small firms fund employment through external financing, then
a collateral restriction can directly limit employment spending. We develop both cases in a simple
theoretic analysis in order to guide our firm-level empirical analysis.
Our analysis relies on a large and detailed financial dataset of United Kingdom firms. We first
distinguish between firms that do and do not own real estate within a set location, and secondly by
the level of real estate shock exposure between land-owning firms. Using the former regression design
we are able to separate the heterogeneous effect of local demand shocks from collateral shocks, and
using the latter we are able to identify the effect of a $ 1 decrease in the value of real estate that
the firm actually owns.
We estimate that firms extract $ 0.25 of debt for every $ 1 increase in real estate values5. The
result is robust to numerous specifications and holds across industries. Instead the estimate appears
driven by financial constraints as the effect decreases with firm age.We find the leverage effect is
driven by secured financing and that short-term loans are particularly susceptible to collateral shocks.
In response to a collateral shock, young firms not only experience a decline in short-term loans, but
also an increase in the interest rate.
We note that our estimates may be driven by an unobserved variable causing firm financing
decisions to be correlated with: (i) local real estate prices or (ii) the decision to own real estate.
To check the first concern we instrument real estate price growth with the local regulatory refusal
rate of major real estate projects. Local areas with high regulatory constraints experience large real
estate price appreciation in response to increase in the aggregate real estate demand while areas
with low regulatory constraints will experience more minor price growth since the demand can be
easily supplied. Secondly, initial real estate holdings are an endogenous choice of the firm. While
5For comparison Chaney et al (2012) find that the representative US public firm extracts only $ 0.04, while Mian
and Sufi (2011)find that the average US homeowner extracts $ 0.25-0.30 for every dollar increase in home equity.
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we do not have a valid instrument for this concern we include a number of firm characteristics that
influence the initial real estate holdings of the firm.
In line with our theoretical model we find that a collateral shock forces firms to cut employment
and investment by $0.07 and $0.10, respectively. Focusing our attention on employment we find
that the estimate increases to $0.11 when instrumenting for real estate price growth. The effect is
strongest during the 2008-2012 years and declines with firm size. Interestingly this effect is entirely
driven by changes in the level of employment as opposed to changes in the average wage. We
highlight that real estate shocks have no direct employment effects for firms with easy access to
alternative external financing by narrowing our analysis to public firms 6.
By appropriately weighting our baseline results and aggregating we are able to tie the decline in
total employment to our firm-level estimates. UK employment rose to a high of 95% in 2007 before
falling 3% by 2009; during this same time frame real estate prices fell approximately 18%. Using a
simple back of the envelope calculation, we find that collateral effects explain about 8% of the total
aggregate employment decline in the economy. Applying estimates from the coefficients from the
2007-2012 subsample doubles our result to 16% with effects as large as 37% for areas worst hit by
the housing crisis.
Our aggregated effects appear to be largest for the youngest and smallest firms. The collateral
channel explains 14-24% of the decline for firms with 10-49 employees, yet only 5-11% of the em-
ployment decline for the largest firms (those with at least 250 employees). Similarly, the decline
in real estate can explain 15-29% of the total decline in employment for the youngest firms, but a
smaller 6-12% of the decline for the oldest firms.
Evaluating only the firm-level effects on aggregate employment, however, misses the second half
of the story. First, it is possible that we are actually overestimating the implications of the small
business collateral channel since the equilibrium fall in prices may actually raise the output of
unconstrained firms and therefore their labor demand. Alternatively, wealth shocks to constrained
firms cause a decline in the demand for material goods. This drop in demand will affect all firms
and may lead us to underestimate the significance of the collateral channel. Using a simple general
equilibrium model we argue that the demand effect cancels out any price effect, leading us to only
6In an online appendix we apply our methodology to study the implications on US public firms. We find evidence
that investment is partially financed through secured debt, but no evidence that employment is finance through
secured debt.
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underestimate the true results. Taken together with our empirical findings we find that the small
business collateral channel is a relevant explanation of the current state of the economy.
Our results are related to recent work by Gan (2007), Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), and
Cvijanovic (2013), who use geographic variation in real estate shocks to highlight the effects of
financial shocks to firm balance sheets. This paper adds to this literature in a number of important
dimensions. While Gan (2007) focuses on investment and Cvijanovic (2013) considers leverage,
we instead test the effects of balance sheet shocks on employment, allowing us to directly tie the
commercial real estate sector to the real economy. Secondly, to our knowledge we are first to
include data on the financial crisis years and slow subsequent economic recovery of 2007-2012, and
so quantitatively evaluate the implications of the small business channel on the Great Recession.
More importantly, however, is that we develop a substantially larger dataset that includes small
and medium size firms. This is significant on two levels. First, by focusing only on small and medium
firms we minimize measurement error that may be biasing the results. The reason is that this line of
literature uses firm headquarters to proxy for the location of the firm, a proxy that is most suspect
for large firms that own real estate in multiple locations. Secondly, due to our representative data
sample we are able to approximate the population-weighted estimates of the employment channel. In
comparison, research that includes only public firms is not able to easily move from microeconomic
evidence to macroeconomic implications.
There is a small literature that examines the effects of financial shocks on small firm employment
such as Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011). Particularly close to our work is Adelino, Antionette,
and Severino (2013) who document the role of collateral lending through home ownership to facilitate
small business starts and self-employment. However, these papers rely only on regional evidence and
do not have data on the financial shock at the firm level 7. In comparison, this paper uses firm-level
evidence and as a result can compare the relative exposure each firm faces to real estate shocks on
the balance sheet. We are able to identify the small business collateral shock separate from related
local demand shocks as well as equilibrium effects8.
Several papers discuss the aggregate demand channel as a potential explanation of the 2007-2009
7One exception is Chodorow-Reich (2013) who uses firm level data to test the effects of lending supply on small
business employment. However, even this paper only includes data on firms that borrow syndicated loans of at least
$100,000 in value.
8For instance Moretti (2009) finds that new jobs in a local area lead to a multiplier effect where additional jobs
are created through increased demand for services
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decline in unemployment: Mian and Sufi (2011) estimates the level of home equity-based borrowing
between 2002-2006, while Mian and Sufi (2012) and Mian et al (2011) consider the effects of the
decrease in equity-based borrowing on employment and consumption, respectively 9. This channel
is difficult to easily quantify for two reasons. First, the aggregate demand channel requires that we
can empirically separate collateral and wealth effects from local demand shocks and market-wide
financial liberalization, which necessitates detailed information on consumption and home values not
available at the household level. Secondly, this channel needs to identify the relationship between
consumption and unemployment. In comparison we are able to (i) match real estate ownings with
real expenditures at the firm level, and (ii) directly quantify the impact of firm balance sheet shocks
on unemployment by narrowing our focus to firm labor expenditures. We find our analysis as
complementary to the aggregate demand literature and view the small business collateral channel
as a valid alternative explanation for the Great Recession.
A related literature instead discusses the employment effects of toxic real estate assets on financial
firm balance sheet. Chodorow-Reich (2013) uses firm-level evidence to test bank lending frictions on
employment outcomes, but considers only a small sample of firms and requires all firms access the
syndicated loan market. Greenstone and Mas (2013) instead must rely only on local data to pursue
their research. This research generally rests on the assumption that firms cannot easily switch to a
different lender; while this may be true in the short-term, these papers are not able to explain the
slow employment recovery both in the US and abroad.
Other researchers have attempted to explain the simultaneous fall in employment and housing
prices through structural issues relating to the reallocation of workers. Charles et al (2013) focus
on the employment decline in the construction sector starting in 200710. Alternatively Ferreira,
Gyourko, and Tracy (2010), Valetta (2012) and Karahan and Rhee (2013) quantify how low housing
values impeded migration to areas with job vacancies11.
These results introduce a new channel to the large literature on the effect of local real estate
prices to household consumption. The large literature on this subject including Case, Quigley, and
9 In a related paper Bils, Klenlow, and Malin (2012) test the Keynesian model that short-run demand for labor is
sensitive to the demand for goods.
10See Sahin et al (2013) for a separate article on the effects of structural unemployment.
11Business uncertainty is a separate explanation of the rise in unemployment not directly related to real estate and
is discussed in Baker et al (2013) and Bloom et al (2013).
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Shiller (2003), Ortalo-Magne and Ray (2001), Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2004), and Campbell
and Cuocco (2007) has generally attributed these shocks to: (i) wealth effects, (ii) collateral effects
on constrained homeowners, (iii) unobserved factors such as expected future income shocks, and
(iv) financial liberalization that simultaneously affects household consumption and real estate prices.
This paper instead presents and quantifies the significance of a fifth channel: income due to collateral
effects on constrained firms.
This paper is based on the foundational work of Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) and is especially close
in spirit to recent theoretical research on the real effects of firm collateral shocks such as Jermann
and Quadrini (2011). Our focus on the indirect effects of the collateral channel- particularly non-
financial linkages between firms due to a demand for material goods- is based on the theoretic model
of Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012). Finally, our empirical work is related in spirit to Liu, Wang,
and Zha (2013a, 2013b) who explore the theoretical relationship between firm real estate shocks and
firm employment decisions. Our own work attempts to quantify the microeconomic significance of
these channels in an attempt to give empirical validity to the theory that firm financial shocks are
responsible for business cycle fluctuations.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the econometric methodology
and the data sources. Section 3 provides the empirical results. Section 4 quantifies the partial and
general equilibrium effects of real estate shocks on firm employment. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology and Data
Accurately estimating the small business collateral channel is not a simple matter. It is not
readily apparent how to isolate the effects of collateral shocks or even if real estate prices affect
firm employment through the collateral channel. We begin this section by developing a simple
static model to develop a clear identification method. According to the theory, collateral shocks
affect employment decisions only when the firm is financially-constrained. Next using firm-level
data we test first how the average firm increases the level of external debt subject to a positive
real estate shock, and secondly how this firm spends the additional borrowing. We control for two
endogeneity concerns. First variation in local real estate price may be endogenous to firm financing
decisions through local demand or firm investment. Secondly, the decision to purchase real estate is
an endogenous choice. We also address numerous sources of potential measurement error and offer
evidence that each source is unlikely to significantly affect our results.
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Prediction from the Theory
Our theoretical model based on the work of Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012) with two key
differences: (i) we focus on firm labor demand as opposed to output, and (ii) we extend the model to
incorporate firm labor demand into the collateral constraint. In our baseline framework we assume
that firms face a collateral constraint and then derive the firm demand for labor in response to a
shock to the collateral constraint. We consider two possible channels for a collateral shock to impact
employment: directly when employment cannot be financed through revenue and indirectly due to
complements between investment and employment in the production function.
From the model we find that only financially-constrained firms increase employment in response
to a real estate shock while unconstrained firms see no effect. We return to the theory when we
aggregate the microeconomic result to the macroeconomy, particularly when we attempt to account
for general equilibrium effects. We develop the theory in the appendix; here we only introduce the
theoretical predictions.
Theoretical Result 1. When firms partially fund employment through external financing the
sensitivity of firm labor to a balance sheet shock is:
(i) positive for any financially-constrained firm
(ii) positive for any financially-constrained firm conditional on firm capital holdings
(iii) zero for any financially-unconstrained firm
Theoretical Result 2. When firms partially fund investment through external financing the
sensitivity of firm labor to a balance sheet shock is:
(i) positive for any financially-constrained firm
(ii) zero for any firm financially-constrained firm conditional on firm capital holdings
(iii) zero for any financially-unconstrained firm
While our theoretical model differs significantly from Cvijanovic (2013) and Chaney et al (2012),
our theoretical predictions are similar and help guide our identification strategy. We note that this
result does not depend on any particular model assumptions and is instead a general result of models
with financial frictions. However, this literature has generally focused on the collateral effects to
firm debt or investment. Unique to our analysis is our emphasis of the effects of firm employment
9
decisions.
Empirical Methodology
The theoretical model implies a convenient and tractable empirical framework. Following the
standard literature we empirically test the impacts of a financial shocks- in our case a real estate
shock- to firm employment.
EmpCostit  β
E
RealEstateit   γ
E
Capitalit   φ
E
t  θ
E
l   ρ
E
Productivityit   α
E
i   λ
E
¸
Xi,0  Plt   ε
E
it (2.1)
Capitalit  β
C
RealEstateit   φ
C
t  θ
C
l   ρ
C
Productivityit   α
C
i   λ
C
¸
Xi,0  Plt   ε
C
it (2.2)
Real Estateit  Plt Real EstateHoldingsi,0 (2.3)
First Capital is total capital expenditures for firm i in period t while Emp Cost is the annual
total cost of employees for firm i in period t. As in our theoretical model we evaluate the effect of an
exogenous shock to the net worth of firm i on investment and employment costs. For this exogenous
shock we use changes in the market value of real estate holdings. Real Estate measures the value
of firm i real estate holdings at time t and so the coefficient βE measures how a $1 increase in this
variable impacts firm employment decisions. To calculate the market value of real estate we interact
the real estate holdings at the start of the sample, Real Estate with P , the price index in location
l at time t12. Assuming that local real estate prices drive the market value of real estate assets this
variable is a valid measurement of the current value of real estate.
Next in our employment regression we condition on capital in the analysis to distinguish between
a firm financially-constrained in capital from one constrained in labor. Specifically, according to our
theoretical predictions if βE ¡ 0 then a sample of firms are financially-constrained in labor. However,
a firm may still be financially-constrained in capital even if βE  0.
Our theory dictates that employment is dependent on economy-wide characteristics- specifically
the wage rate, the interest rate, and total production. It is critical to control for these factors
12This is necessary since real estate holdings in our data are not marked to market but instead valued at historical
cost.
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in our analysis since the real estate shock affects all firms collectively through equilibrium effects.
For instance a negative shock to net worth results to a decrease in the labor demands of financially-
constrained firms; however, this affect will also cause an decrease in the equilibrium wage rate and can
actually lead to an increase in the labor demand of unconstrained firms. In practice employment
is likely influenced by any number of unobservable variables. Therefore we instead include time
fixed effects φ interacted with location l fixed effects. In this specification we absorb all unobserved
variation within a single location in a particular time period.
Additionally our theoretical model implies firm labor decision is dependent on the firm produc-
tivity and so included in the regression. Of course productivity is an unobservable characteristic that
cannot be easily calculated. Therefore we also allow for unobserved firm heterogeneity by including
firm fixed effects α. Finally we cluster all error terms at the level of YearRegion.
Endogeneity Concerns
The primary concern with our methodology is that the value of real estate is not exogenous.
First the initial real estate holdings, Real Estate Holdings, is not actually exogenous but instead
an endogenous choice of the firm. Secondly, the local real estate prices, P, and firm employment
may be jointly determined by an omitted time-varying variable, notably local demand shocks. We
discuss both concerns below.
Government Regulation of Real Estate as a Source of Exogenous Variation
Since firm employment and local real estate values may be correlated through an omitted variable
we need an exogenous source of variation in local real estate price growth. Recall that we include the
time fixed effects interacted with local fixed effects. Therefore there is only a potential endogeneity
concern if firms that hold real estate are subject to local demand shocks unique from firms that do
not own real estate.
To overcome this issue my first test exploits variation in real estate government regulation as
an instrument for real estate price growth. As discussed in Cvijanovic (2013) the intuition for this
approach is that the slope of the land supply curve determines how a national real estate demand
shock will affect real estate prices in a given area. Local areas with high regulatory constraints
experience large real estate price appreciation in response to an increase in the aggregate real estate
demand while areas with low regulatory constraints will experience more minor price growth since
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the demand can be easily supplied.
In a recent paper Mian and Sufi (2011) find that between 1997-2006 inelastic US MSAs experi-
enced house price growth of over 100% while elastic areas saw no increase in house price. To our
knowledge we are the first to apply this instrument to data from the United Kingdom. In order to
use government regulation as a source of exogenous variation we need to document that this measure
offers a single source of variation that explains the real estate price.
To instrument for real estate price growth we follow a similar strategy as Himmelberg, Mayer,
and Sinai (2005) and interact the regulatory housing supply measure with the interest rate I and
include year fixed effects and local fixed effects.
Plt  β
P pRefusallt{Itq   φ
P
t   θ
P
l   ε
P
lt (2.4)
The results gives us an instrumented real estate price variable for each local area and each time
period.
Firm Characteristic Controls that Determine Initial Real Estate Holdings
By instrumenting for real estate price growth we have controlled for the possibility that firms
that hold real estate are differentially affected by local demand shocks. We now turn to the second
concern: initial real estate holdings are an endogenous choice of the firm. Therefore we include a
number of firm characteristics that influence the initial real estate holdings of the firm. We interact
each control by the local price index at time t to allow for shocks to the value of real estate each
period.
We include controls that appear to explain the decision to purchase real estate and denote these
firm characteristics by
°
Xi,0 where Xi,0 denotes a decile indicator variables for firm i in the first
initial period13. Our firm controls include: (i) total assets, (ii) employment costs, (iii) materials costs,
(iv) return on real estate, (v) firm age, (vi) industry codes, and (vii) location controls. To control
for the total demand of real estate we include controls on total assets. Next, total employment costs
13We are not the first to suggest that firms that own real estate have different characteristics from firms that rent.
Krishan and Moyer (1994) find that lessee firms have lower retained earnings relative to total assets, higher growth
rates, higher debt ration, and higher bankruptcy than non-lessee firms. Using 3000 public and private firms from the
UK Levis and Lasfer (1998) find that leasing firms are more likely to have tax losses, high fixed capital adjustment,
high debt-to-equity ratios and to be larger. Lastly, Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) find firms with a high operating
lease-to-total lease ratio pay no dividends, have lower earnings to sales, have lower credit ratings, and are generally
smaller.
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as well as total material costs allow for complementarities in firm production between real estate
and employment as well as real estate and materials. Return on real estate is used as a measure
of idiosyncratic real estate productivity, and we use firm age as an ex-ante measure of financial-
constraint. We also include industry classification to allow for heterogeneous real estate ownership
demands among industries and location controls to allow for local differences in ownership.
Data Sources
Real Estate Data
Halifax House Price Index Our primary source of data is from the Halifax House Price
Index, which is derived from mortgage data of the country's largest mortgage lender. The data is
available at the regional level since 1983 and includes data on a total of twelve different geographic
regions. Overall, the UK experienced a boom period between 2002-2007 and a slower bust period
2007-2012. The United Kingdom Price Index increased from 81% during the boom period before
falling 18% from its peak.
Northern Ireland had both the largest boom and the largest bust of all UK regions and seems
to move more closely with the rest of the Ireland island price indices. In particular, the nominal
price index increased a full 175% between 2002 and 2007 before dropping by over 50% from its peak.
Outside of Ireland, the Northern region had the second greatest boom period increasing 121% over
the first five years in the sample.
Local Planning Authority House Price Index The Local Planning Authority House Price
Index is from Hilber and Vermoulen (2013).The data are developed from the Land Registry for 1995-
2008. They first account for the composition of sales using a mix-adjustment approach by holding
the share of each housing type constant. Then to determine the LPA-specific weights they average
the share of sales of each type for each period.
Nationwide House Price Index Our secondary UK Regional Housing data comes from
Nationwide, which is derived from Nationwide lending data for properties at the post survey approval
stage. The data are available starting in 1980 and breaks down the UK into thirteen geographic
regions.
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FTSE Commercial Property Index We use the FTSE UK Commercial Property Index
Series. The index is derived from the values of the index constituents that are available for purchase
in the market; assets used in the calculations currently top ï¾÷60 billion in value. It also includes
three additional sector indices covering: Office Property, Industrial Property, and Retail Property.
Real Estate Regulation Data
English Local Planning Authority Regulatory Decisions We develop a measure of hous-
ing supply from the direct regulatory decisions for all English Local Planning Authorities (LPAs)
on an annual basis between 1979 and 2008 from the Planning Statistics Group at the Department
for Communities and Local Government. The data are matched to the LPA using the 2001 LPA
boundaries. Regulatory decisions are defined as both refusal rates and planning delays.
In Figure 2.1 we graph the total growth in real LPA house prices between 1995-2007 on the
average yearly refusal rate. We find that a one-percentage point increase in the refusal rate predicts
a 1.57% increase in real local house prices between 1995-200714.
Accounting Data
AMADEUS AMADEUS is a commercial dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) and
contains detailed information on approximately ten million individual public and private firms across
Europe as well as their subsidiaries around the world. The data is generally collected from local
information providers, usually the local company registrars, and the data is available at the yearly
level. We use a ten year period from 2002-2012 and drop all financial firms, as well as all firms
in real estate, insurance, construction, and mining. We also drop any observations with missing
variables. We exclude all firms that enter the sample after 2002. We are left with a total of 94,973
total Firm-Year observations.
We next collect data on the firms' real estate holdings; we use Capital (item TFAS) as a proxy
for the initial real estate holdings of the firm and then take the ratio over lagged Total Assets
(item TOAS). As discussed earlier we then interact this variable with the local price index each
14These results closely relate to Hilber and Vermoulen (2013) who find that 2008 real estate prices in the average
local planning authority (LPA) would be 35% lower if the regulatory supply constraints were completely relaxed, 10%
lower absent of scarcity constraints, and 3% lower in the absence of elevation differentials.
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period to capture the relative differences in market values of real estate holdings. We note that an
alternative framework would instead define the real estate value of a firm to be gross current total
fixed assets; pursuing this avenue would minimize potential measurement error concerns but would
form additional endogeneity concerns. In particular in response to real estate price growth it is
possible that firms purchase additional real estate. This will then tend to bias our results upwards.
Emp Cost is defined as the Total Cost of Employees (item STAF) over lagged Total Assets
(TOAS). In addition we define two additional employment variables: Employees is defined as the
Number of Employees (EMPL) over lagged Total Assets (TOAS), while Avg Emp Cost is defined
as the Average Cost of Employees (item ACE) in real terms.
We consider a range of debt variables. Our non-current debt variables include Long-Term Debt
(item LTDB), and Other Current Debt (item OCLI). Our current debt variables are Short Term Loans
(item LOAN),Trade Credit (item CRED), and OtherNon-Current Debt (item OCLI). As before all
debt variables are calculated over lagged Total Assets (item TOAS). Our variable Total Debt is then
defined as the sum of debt variables.
We have only a noisy measure of the short-term interest rate (item INTE); however, we also have
the credit period in days (item CRDE). Therefore we determine the term structure by regressing
the short-term interest on the credit period and then defining the Short-Term Interest Rate as the
residual of the regression.There are two other financing variables included in the analysis: Equity
(item SFHD) and Cash (item CASH) normalized by lagged Total Assets.
We also include additional variables on firm expenditures and finances. Materials Cost is the
Cost of Goods Sold (item COST) minus Total Cost of Employees (item STAF) all over Total Assets.
Our definition of Investment is the Annual Change in Total Fixed Assets (TFAS) accounting for
Depreciation (item DEPR). We define Revenue as the ratio of net income (item OPRE) to lagged
total assets and Profit as gross profit before taxes (item PLBT) normalized by lagged Total Assets.
Finally, we winsorize all variables at the 5th and 95th percentile15.
We first summarize the accounting data of UK firms in our sample in Table 1. The median firm
in our sample has only 63 employees with the 25th and 75th percentile at 24 and 154 employees,
respectively. Our smallest firms have only a single employee, while the largest firm has 471,108 on its
15One exception is our measure of the short-term interest rate. We instead winsorize at the 10th and 90th percentile
due to the large variation in this variable.
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payroll. Therefore our data include the small firms most likely to depend on collateral for external
financing.
The mean firm has a 1.89 ratio of revenue to total assets and a profit ratio of 0.05. The firm
spends 0.98 on materials, 0.40 on employees, and 0.05 on investment in capital. We find that net
total debt is 69% of total assets for the mean firm; this ratio of net debt to total assets is broken
into 14% for long-term debt, 4.4% for other non-current debt, 19% for short term loans, 15% for
trade credit, and 16% for other current debt.
We consider two alternative sources of financing: Equity, and Cash. The mean firm has an equity
to total assets ratio 0f 0.28 and a cash ratio of 0.11. Therefore our representative firms rely heavily
on debt likely due to a lack of alternative financing options16.
Lastly, we consider our real estate variables: the value of firm real estate and the local price
index. We find that the value of real estate is 28% of total assets for the mean firm and 21% for the
median firm. In addition the price index starts at a value of 1 for all locations in 2002 and has a
mean value of 1.46 and a median value of a similar 1.41.
We also summarize the decline of the economy between 2007 and 2009 in Table 14. Real estate
prices declined on average 17% while revenue decreased from 1.95 to 1.79 or 8%. The decline in
revenue resulted in a 20% drop in investment, a 7% drop in employment spending and an 8% drop
in materials spending. Finally debt decreased by 13% during the two year period with a decline in
long-term debt, short-term loans, and trade credit of 9%, 13%, and 13%, respectively.
Our empirical methodology requires a measure of productivity. We employ the semi-parametric
procedure suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) to estimate each parameter of the production func-
tion. The advantage of this approach over OLS is its ability to control for selection and simultaneity
biases as well as deal with the firm serial correlation in productivity. We estimate the materials good
share at 0.70, the labor share is estimated to be 0.28 and a capital share of 0.02. The result are fairly
constant across time and by industry, although the capital share is slightly higher for manufacturing.
These results suggest a large materials cost share and correspond with Jones (2011) who finds that
overall intermediate goods share for the U.S. economy is about 43.4%, which is lower for service
industries and higher for tradable goods. We discuss the estimation details in the appendix.
16Our results validate Robb and Robinson (2010) who find that small firms rely heavily on bank financing compared
to alternative external funding sources.
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As discussed in Tuzel and Imrohoroglu (2013) even though productivity and profitability are
expected to be related, their calculation and interpretation are different. Theoretically profit is the
rent to firm owners while productivity is a measure of the efficiency of the firm in converting inputs
to outputs. In fact a number of papers- including Gourio (2007) and Novy-Marx (2013)- proxy
unobserved productivity with profitability. We present the correlations in Table 17. We find that
productivity and profitability are correlated at 0.22.
Worldscope Worldscope includes data on both public and private firms throughout the world.
We merge our AMADEUS dataset with Worldscope for an accurate measure of real estate holdings.
We use data from 2002-2012. Once we merge the data with AMADEUS we have a total of 5,348
total firm-year observations for 544 firms.
Net Land is defined as gross land (item 18375) over depreciated land (item 18383). Net buildings
is defined as gross buildings (item 18376) over depreciated buildings (item 18384). Net machinery
is calculated as gross machinery (item 18377) over depreciated machinery (item 18384). Net rental
properties is gross rental properties (item 18378) over depreciated rental properties (item 18385).
Net transport is gross transportation (item 18380) over depreciated transportation (item 18388). Net
capital leases are defined as gross capital lease (item 18381) over depreciated capital leases (item
18389). Net construction in progress is calculated as gross construction in progress (item 18390)
over depreciated construction in progress (item 18392), net other PPE is gross other PPE (18379)
over depreciated Other PPE (item 18387).
With all this we can then define net real estate as the sum of: net land, net buildings, and net
construction. We define total fixed assets as the sum of all net land, net buildings, net construction
in progress, net capital lease, net transportation, net machinery, net rental properties, and net other
PPE.
Measurement Issues
There are a number of potential measurement error concerns in our analysis. We discuss each
issue and offer evidence that our results are not driven by measurement error.
Real Estate Holdings
The first concern is that we proxy for real estate holdings using the Tangible Fixed Assets;
therefore we need real estate to be a significant portion of Tangible Fixed Assets. We confirm our
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proxy using the National Balance Sheet from the UK Office of Statistics in Table 18. The National
Balance Sheet data shows the estimated market value of financial and non-financial assets, that is,
what these assets would realize if sold at market value. Non-financial assets include both tangible
and intangible assets. Tangible Fixed Assets is broken into four components: (i) Dwellings, (ii)
Other Buildings and Structures, (iii) Machinery and Equipment, and (iv) Cultivated Assets. We
find that in 2012 Real Estate makes up 64.8% of Tangible Fixed Assets, broken into Commercial
Real Estate (54.6%) and Residential Real Estate (13.2%). This evidence supports our proxy for real
estate holdings.
Of course, the results may be different depending on the type of firm. Given our research focus
we also verify that real estate makes up the majority of small firm fixed assets. Unfortunately the
United Kingdom has no aggregate data on small firm balance sheet. Instead we use US data from the
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds and summarize the results in Table 19. We find that noncorporate
firm (i.e. sole proprietorships and limited partnerships) real estate holdings make up 91% of all
non-financial assets and 66% of total assets. In comparison, corporate firm real estate holdings
make up 59% of non-financial assets and 30% of total assets. Therefore our proxy seems particularly
reasonable for smaller firms
A second concern with this evidence, however, is that the data do not clearly differentiate between
real estate ownership and financial leasing. According to the United Kingdom Accounting Standards,
leases are broken down into operating leases or financial leases. While a financial lease is any lease
that transfers substantially all the risks and rewards of the ownership of an asset to the lessee, it is
likely that leased real estate cannot be collateralized for a loan or debt contract.
To check that our real estate measure is not driven by leases, we use data from Worldscope to
develop a detailed measure of real estate holdings for a subset of our firm-year observations. We
find in Table 20 that 72% of all firms in this subsample own some form of real estate. In addition
owned real estate makes up 29% of all fixed assets within a firm and 53% of all fixed assets for firms
that own real estate. In comparison rental costs and financial leases each make up 0.2% of total
fixed assets. When we break down owned real estate holdings we find that 87% of all real estate
is made up of buildings while 6% is land and the remaining 7% is construction in progress. The
remaining PPE includes Machinery (29% of PPE), Transportation (4% of PPE), and Other PPE
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(the last 38%)17.
A third concern with our measure of real estate holdings is that firms may increase their real
estate portfolio in response to positive real estate price growth, causing us to overestimate the true
results. Therefore we instead interact the 2002 Fixed Total Assets with local real estate markets.
However, this strategy has its own concerns. In particular it is possible that firms are drastically
buying or selling real estate after 2002, causing significant errors in our measure of real estate
holdings. After accounting for depreciation we find that there is only a 3% yearly change in total
fixed assets for the median firm.
Firm Location
Next, we assume that the majority of a firm's real estate holdings are located in the same
geographic area as the firm headquarters. This will bias our results if the firm owns significant real
estate in another location. We note that given the median firm in our sample has only 63 employees
this concern seems minor18.
However we redo our analysis using only small and medium firms (defined in the UK as 250
employees or less) and find that our results only increase in magnitude by this restriction. In
addition,we consider three separate definitions of location for our fixed effects specification- UK
Local Planning Authority, UK Region, and UK- and find that our results appear similar.
Regional Commercial Real Estate Index
We use the Regional Residential Real Estate Index as a proxy for the Regional Commercial Real
Estate Index19. This could lead to a biased estimate if the residential and commercial real estate
indices are uncorrelated. We compare the quarterly fluctuations between the Halifax Residential
Real Estate Index and the FTSE Commercial Real Estate Index from 2006-2012 in Table 21.We find
that the indices have a 93% correlation. In addition we find the residential index is correlated with
the office index, industrial index, and retail index at levels of 90%, 93%, and 94%. We take this as
17It seems reasonable that these results will not be particularly different for private firms. Using UK data on both
3000 public and private firms, Levis and Lasfer (1998) find that 56% of firms in the smallest decile have a lease
compared to 55% of firms in the largest decile.
18We also acknowledge that Garcia and Norli (2013) find that the median US public firm has offices in only 5 states
and in only 4 states for the smallest third by market capitalization. Looking at the 20% least geographically diverse
these numbers reduce to 2.6 states, and 2.1 states.
19To our knowledge there does not exist a UK Commercial Price Index for individual cities or regions.
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evidence that our results are driven by our price index proxy.
Accurate Representation of the Firm Population
We check that our data sample from the Amadeus dataset includes the full range of UK firms
and can therefore represent the actual population. This is necessary since we use our results to
estimate the total impact of the small business collateral channel to the economy.
We measure the UK firm population from the UK Business: Activity, Size, and Location dataset
from the Office of National Statistics. in the 2011 Amadeus dataset to the 20. We use the Analysis
of UK VAT and/or PAYE based Enterprises tables, Table B1.2 Districts, Counties, and Unitary
Authorities within Region and Country by Employment Size Band.
We outline the data in Table 22. According to the Office of Statistics the UK has approximately
2.1 million firms, broken into 1.6 million with 0-4 employees (76% of the population), 268,000 with
5-9 employees (13% of the population), 124,000 with 10-19 employees (6% of the population), 66,000
with 20-49 employees (3% of the population), 22,000 with 50-99 employees (1% of the population),
12,000 with 100-249 employees (0.6% of the population), and 8,600 with at least 250 employees
(0.4% of the population).
In comparison our cleaned data sample has a total of 9,552 firms as of 2002, separated into 942
firms with 0-4 employees (10% of the sample), 189 firms with 5-9 employees (2% of the sample),
530 firms with 10-19 employees (6% of the dataset), 1769 firms with 20-49 employees (19% of the
sample), 2,647 firms with 50-99 employees (28% of the dataset), 2,368 firms with 100-249 employees
(25% of the dataset), and 1,973 firms with at least 250 employees (21% of the dataset).Therefore our
sample includes firms from the very smallest to the very largest. As a result our estimates should
not be biased due to selection into the sample.
When we break the dataset by firm age, we find that the UK has 306,000 firms under two years
old, 270,000 firms 2-3 years old, 579,000 4-9 years old, and 926,000 ten or more years old. In our
sample we have 952 firms under two years old in 2002 (10%), 831 2-3 years old (9%), 1,909 firms
that 4-9 years old (20%), and 5,860 firms that are at least ten years old (61% of the sample).
20While our dataset includes years through 2012, we only have access to a small subset of the 2012 Amadeus files.
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Evaluating the Decision to Purchase Real Estate
Recall that one concern with our analysis is that firms that own real estate in the initial period
are fundamentally different from firms that choose not to own real estate. To alleviate that concern
we have included numerous controls that interact observable firm characteristics with the local price
index measures.
In Table 23 we offer evidence that our chosen characteristics do indeed explain the level of firm
real estate holdings. We believe this is additional evidence that firms that choose to own real estate
are not differentially impacted by local demand shocks that may be driving our results.
Real EstateHoldingsi0  α
R
i   λ
¸
Xi,0   εt (2.5)
We note of course that there are both observable and unobservable characteristics that we do not
include in the controls, some of which will also affect the real estate ownership decision. Therefore
to verify that initial real estate holdings are not driving our results we allow for numerous robustness
checks in our empirical analysis. This is suggestive evidence that even if additional characteristics
enter into the ownership decision, they should not significantly bias our baseline results on the impact
of real estate shocks to employment and financing decisions.
Results
We next explore the microeconomic implications of the small business collateral channel. We
verify two separate statements: (i) debt holdings are affected by real estate shocks, and (ii) this
affect on debt has implications on firm expenditure decisions. According to our estimation, the
mean firm borrows $0.25 out of every $1 increase in the value of real estate to spend on employment
($0.07) and investment ($0.10). Overall the results confirm the microeconomic foundation of the
small business collateral channel.
Financing Results
How do Small Firms Increase Leverage when Collateral Values Rise?
We first clearly identify that a collateral shock has an effect on firm debt; this is necessary for
our analysis on employment to be taken seriously. We run the baseline regression on debt
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We find that indeed leverage is positively affected by a real estate shock; specifically firms borrow
an additional $ 0.25 for every $ 1 increase in real estate. We present our baseline results in Table
3. In our specifications (i)-(ii) we display OLS results using regional price data, while specifications
(iii)-(iv) use the LPA price index for England and instrument for real estate price growth.
One concern with our analysis is that our results are driven by unobserved variation within a
particular location and year. For instance consider the possibility that real estate shocks are actually
affecting the balance sheet of consumers (instead of the firm balance sheet) and this is driving our
results through the decline in local demand. We address this issue by directly comparing firms that
should be subject to the same consumer demand shock (i.e. we compare the effect of collateral shocks
on firms within the same local area) and so absorb any unobserved variation with each year-location
pair. Columns (ii) allows for year fixed effects interacted with Local Planning Authority (LPA) fixed
effects. We find that our results do not change with the additional fixed effects and that we still
have a significant estimate of $0.24.
We next focus on the instrumented variable results in specification (iii)-(iv). Recall that our
measure of local real estate variation is the interaction of the refusal rate and the UK 30-year
conventional rate. In Table 16 we include our first stage instrumental variable results and find that
a one unit increase in the interaction term results in a 0.35 increase in the local real estate price.
In specification (iii) we allow for year fixed effects while in specification (iv) we include year LPA
fixed effects. We find the comparable values of $0.25 and $0.21 for (iv) and (v), respectively.
We find that a 1 unit increase in productivity increases debt by $0.17 for the OLS results and
$0.209 for the IV results. We believe the significance of this variable can be readily explained by
the high correlation between profitability and productivity. According to a Neoclassical model of
investment with perfect capital markets the coefficient of cashflow should be zero. In contrast, a
positive and significant coefficient implies firms are financially constrained and must rely on internal
cash flows instead of external financing. If our firms are indeed borrowing against commercial real
estate to finance the firm, then we should find that (i) the productivity coefficient is positive and
significant and (ii) the real estate coefficient decreases from our first estimate. According to Table 3
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this is exactly the case.
How do these results compare to previous studies? Cvijanovic (2013) uses a similar empirical
strategy and finds that $ 1 increase in Real Estate Value increases debt ownings by only $ 0.06 for US
public firms. However, focusing exclusively on financially-constrained firms and owned real estate (as
opposed to real estate in a capital lease), Cvijanovic finds that this coefficient increases significantly
to $0.19. Secondly, using US data from the Small Survey of Business Finances Meisenzahl (2013)
finds than an additional dollar of total net worth increases external financing by about 30 cents.
Lastly, our results also seem closely in line with Mian and Sufi (2010) who find that households
extract $ 0.25-$ 0.30 from home equity borrowing during 2002-2006.
Are Alternative Explanations Driving our Results?
In Table 4 we divide our data sample into subsets in order to test several alternative theories
that may be driving our results.
Alternative Price Index Since our real estate proxy is based exclusively on data from a single
mortgage lender (though admittedly the largest lender) we check that are results are not driven by
our particular choice for a price index. We estimate our work using the alternative Nationwide Price
Index, which is derived from Nationwide lending data for properties at the post survey approval
stage. Our results are nearly identical with a $ 1 increase in real estate values resulting in a $ 0.23
increased in debt.
Boom and Bust Years A second concern is that our results in the second half of the sample
(the years 2007-2012) are entirely driving our results. If this is the case then we may be concerned
that our estimation results are due to influences of the depressed macroeconomy on real estate
owning firms. We find that firm leverage is positively and significantly affected by real estate
during both the boom and bust periods. We estimate a coefficient of $0.30 during 2002-2007 and a
2007-2012 value of $0.35. We note that the heterogeneous effect during the boom and bust is not
surprising. Theory implies that real estate shocks will only have an effect on financially-constrained
firms. Therefore, during periods of high real estate prices, the mean firm is likely less constrained
by collateral requirements, and thus our estimate will be smaller. However, as prices start to drop
previously unconstrained firms will become financially-constrained and as a result the estimated
effect of real estate shocks will become larger. These results closely align with theoretical models
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that include an occasionally binding borrowing constraint21.
Small/Medium and Large Firms Next, we check how firm size affects our estimation. It
is possible our causality is actually reversed since it is possible that major employers are actually
driving the real estate price market. Alternatively, it might be that by using the headquarters as the
firm location we are actually including significant measurement error into our estimation. Excluding
larger firms is one possible solution to mitigate both issues.
Therefore, we break down the analysis into small and medium firms (defined as less than 250
employees in the UK) and large firms. If reverse causality/firm location is driving our results then
the smaller employers should not be affected by real estate shocks. We find that in fact both
small/medium and large firms are affected by real estate shocks where the effect is $0.25 and $0.24
out of $1 of real estate value gains form small/medium and large firms, respectively.
Tradable and Nontradable Industries In addition, we may be concerned that shocks to
consumer balance sheets, instead of firm balance sheets, are driving our results. This is of course
possible if firms that own real estate are comparatively more affected by consumer demand shocks. To
address this concern we now compare our results separately for tradable and nontradable industries.
Our definitions of tradable and non-tradable industries are based on the classification scheme in
Mian and Sufi (2012). If both industries are similarly affected, then our results are not driven by
local demand shocks.We estimate that the $1 shock to real estate translates into a $0.25 and a $0.19
change in total net debt for non-tradable and tradable firms, respectively.
High and Low Productivity Our final robustness check is that firms with real estate holdings
may simply be more productive or better able to take advantage of financing opportunities. Therefore
we split our sample into quartiles by returns on assets (RTAS) and compare firms within the same
quartile. We estimate the real estate shock on low RTAS firms at 0.298, compared to a coefficient
of 0.249 for high RTAS firms.
Are Credit-Constrained Firms More Likely to Increase Leverage?
21See Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2013) for a general equilibrium model with occasionally binding borrowing con-
straints.
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Our analysis is based on the premise that firms use real estate as a pledgable asset to gain access
to external finance; this implies that financially-constrained firms will increase debt subject to a
positive real estate shock while unconstrained firms will not be affected. To test this premise we
separate firms into age cohorts based on firm age in 2002, with the intuition that young firms are
ex-ante more financially-constrained than older firms. We graph the results for the third to the tenth
decile in Figure 2.2.
Age is of particular interest in our analysis as young firms are disproportionately responsible for
the employment growth and declines. We find exactly this same result as both employment growth
and employment costs growth are largest for the youngest firms. Therefore for our results to have
macroeconomic significance we need young firms to be particularly affected by real estate shocks.
As expected we find that collateral shocks have a comparatively larger effect on the youngest
firms, and that this effect declines monotonically with age. In particular we find that the youngest
firms extract up to $0.33 while firms at least 50 year of age borrow only $0.17. This result gives
additional credibility to our OLS results; if local demand shocks on land-holding firms were driving
our estimation then young and old firms with the same exposure to the real estate market should
be similarly affected by collateral shocks. Together we use Figure 2.2 as further evidence that it is
financial constraints, and not some other unobservable factor, that is driving our estimation results.
Are Real Estate Shocks Really Collateral Shocks?
Our estimates thus far have focused exclusively on total debt. However, if our real estate shock
is indeed a collateral shock then we would find the greatest impact on secured debt. Unfortunately,
we do not have data on the level of secured debt holdings for each firm. We instead focus our
analysis on long-term debt and short-term loans since nearly 70% of all long-term debt and 30-40%
of short-term loans are secured (Berger and Udell 1990).
We break down firm debt into five categories: long-term debt, all other non-current debt obli-
gations, short-term loans, trade credit, and all other current debt obligations. As expected, we see
that the collateral effect is largest for long-term debt ($ 0.06) and short-term loans ($ 0.06). In
comparison we find smaller effects on other types of current debt ($ 0.04), trade credit ($ 0.04), and
other non-current debt ($ 0.04). Our research highlights the comparative significance of real estate
shocks on more formal credit channels (such as short-term loans and long-term debt) over more
informal networks (such as trade credit). As a result we find that real estate price increases appear
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to allow firms to increase their secured debt holdings relative to non-secured debt holdings. In this
way balance sheet shocks alter not only the level of total debt, but also the capital structure.
Are Short-Term Loans Driving the Small Business Collateral Channel?
Our long-term debt estimates are particularly close to previous results. Chaney, Sraer, and
Thesmar (2012) find a real estate shock results in a $0.04 increase in long-term debt, while Cvijanovic
(2013) estimate the effect at $0.06. However, these same papers have found that real estate shocks
have no effect on short-term debt even though 30-40% of short term debt is secured. We instead
find a large and significant effect. This discrepancy is likely due to our particular focus on small
firms instead of US public firms 22.
We confirm this assumption in Table 5 by comparing how constrained firms increase short-term
debt subject to a collateral shock. We find that the youngest firms in the sample, those under five
years of age in 2002, increase short-term debt by $0.08, while firms of twenty years or greater increase
short-term debt by $0.03 (a value not significant at the 5% level). Therefore, the effect on short-term
loans appears to die out as firms gain access to alternative financing. We offer further evidence of the
short-term loan channel by considering the role of the price of short-term debt. As expected we find
that a positive real estate shock results in significantly cheaper financing; specifically the decline in
the value of real estate between 2007 and 2009 resulted in a 0.1% increase in the short-term interest
rate.
We believe these results may be able to explain a number of recent puzzles in the corporate
finance literature. For instance Custodio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2012) find that the use of long-
term debt by small US corporate firms has decreased in recent decades. According to our results
the rise in real estate prices over the past two decades should be met with a comparative rise in the
use of short-term loans among small firms.
What Kind of Industries Extract from Commercial Real Estate Equity?
Industries more dependent on external financing- such as those with large and regular investment
22The existing theoretical literature such as Vishwanathan and Rampini (2010) can help us understand this dis-
crepancy. They develop a model that collateral mitigates informational imperfections allowing firms to increase their
relative level of arm's length debt financing. This implies that in addition to increasing the borrowing constraint,
collateral also expands the set of available financing opportunities. Therefore financially-unconstrained firms with
large collateral holdings should rely primarily on arm's length financing such as long-term debt, while constrained
firms will be more dependent on short-term loans.
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needs- should be highly affected by collateral shocks. We break up firms by NAICS two-digit codes,
resulting in 12 total industry groups and plot our results in Table 6 23. We find positive and
statistically significant real estate coefficients for all industries with the smallest estimate at 0.13 for
the retail trade industry (NAICS 4400-4500). We find only minor differences between Manufacturing
(NAICS 3100-3300)- estimated to be 0.19- and service industries such as Accomodation and Food-
estimated to be 0.25. Overall our results do not appear to be driven by any particular industry.
Investment and Spending Results
How do Collateral Shocks Effect Investment Decisions?
While our results on debt are certainly informative, the financing estimates alone do not help us
understand the actual implications of the small business collateral channel on the macroeconomy.
First of all, the level of debt is only one measure of the external financing supply; firm spending
will in addition be affected by additional debt characteristics such as the price of borrowing and
the availability of alternative sources of financing. Secondly, it is necessary to actually quantify how
firms spend the financing. Firms that pay off more expensive forms of credit are simply using the
debt to change the capital structure of the firm, resulting in only minimal effects on the rest of
the economy. However, a decrease in investment will result in a drop in aggregate demand, while
a decline in labor expenditure will affect aggregate employment. We briefly discuss the results on
investment before covering the effects on employment.
We first estimate that a $1 real estate shock results in a $0.09 investment in capital. The estimates
in Table 7 appear robust to the particular choice of price index. Large and small firms appear to
depend similarly on collateral for new investments. This is in contrast to our employment results.
We actually find a slightly larger effect of 0.11 for the 2002-2007 years. Tradable good industries
see a $0.10 increase in capital, while nontradable firms see a smaller $0.07. The coefficient is 0.069
for the low productivity firm subsample and 0.085 for highly productive firms, implying the result
is not driven by productivity differences among firms. These results are closely in line with previous
estimates: Cvijanovic finds a $0.06 increase in the investment of highly constrained public firms.
Does a Decline in Firm Expenditures Indirectly Impact Employment?
23We exclude industries where our sample includes less than 1000 firm-year observations.
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Thus far we have exclusively focused on quantifying how a decline in firm financing opportunities
affects employment for that firm. Of course employment could simultaneously drop due to the decline
in demand for firm investment and materials. In this case all firms face a decline in employment, even
if they do not individually face a financial shock. This mechanism closely relates to the Aggregate
Demand Hypothesis, which states that the Great Recession was driven by negative real estate
shocks to the household balance sheet. Instead we argue that small business demand for material
and tangible investment goods declined due to similar shocks on the firm balance sheet.
Our current empirical framework is not able to easily quantify the general equilibrium effects of
the small business collateral channel. Therefore our aggregate results will only quantify the direct
implications of collateral shocks on employment. Instead we return to this discussion when we
evaluate the equilibrium effects of the small business collateral channel 24.
Employment Results
How do Collateral Shocks Affect Employment Decisions?
We now evaluate the impact of real estate shocks on firm employment decisions. We first present
the baseline regression in Table 8. We find that a $1 real estate shock increases employment by $0.07
when we include only year fixed effects. Expanding to including year LPA fixed effects does not
alter the baseline result. We next instrument for real estate price growth using the interaction of the
LIBOR rate and the LPA average regulatory refusal rate. Our instrumental variables results increase
the estimates to $0.11, and suggest that our OLS estimates may actually be underestimating the
true channel.
For robustness we also attempt several robustness checks in Table 9. First, we find that our
results are not driven by the choice of price index; using an alternative price index from Nationwide
our estimates remains nearly identical at 0.07. Secondly, we find using the Pre-Recession years of
2002 to 2008 decreases only slightly to a $0.07. However the 2007-2012 subsample coefficient doubles
to $0.13.
24An alternative approach to test demand effects on the economy developed by Mian and Sufi (2012) compares the
effects of tradable and nontradable employment. They find that 2007-2009 job losses in the non-tradable sector were
significantly higher in high leverage US counties, while losses in the tradable sector were distributed evenly. While
their framework is able to separate the effects of the decline in demand from the Business Uncertainty Hypothesis
or the Structural Unemployment Hypothesis, it is not able to identify if the decline in demand is due to a drop in
consumer demand or local business demand.
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Distinguishing between firms below and above 250 employees has an impact on our estimation.
small/medium firms pay employees $0.10 more while large firms pay $0.059 more for each $1 gain
in real estate values. This is in contrast to our debt results where firm size had little effect on our
estimates. The result suggests that even though large firms may use real estate as a pledgable asset
for external financing, they are better able to access financing when collateral is scarce. To check
that consumer demand shocks are not driving the results we test differences between tradable and
nontradable goods. Our results remain positive and significant at 0.06 when focusing exclusively
on the tradable good sector. Finally, the results cannot be explained by productivity differences
between firms that do and do not own real estate.
These results introduce a new channel to the large literature on the effect of local real estate
prices to household consumption. We compare our results to two recent research papers on the
subject. First, imposing a structural general equilibrium model on national US data Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) find that national consumption responds $0.13 for a dollar change in housing value. Of
course In a separate study relying on county and zipcode level data Mian and Sufi (2013) compare
the effects of home prices on consumption in low and highly-leverage counties and zip codes to find
that households consume an additional $0.05-0.07 out of $1 of housing wealth. In addition they find
this value is significantly higher in areas with a high housing leverage ratio, which is likely driven
by a consumer collateral effect25.
Are our Results driven by a Change in Employment or Wages?
We next test if this result is driven by a cut in the number of employees or the average real wage.
Our results are clear: the effect of a shock to collateral is positive and significant at the 1% level.
Wages, however, actually appear to decrease slightly in response to a positive real estate shock.
Therefore, focusing on the total employment bill actually results in an underestimate of the true
employment effects. The full results are included in Table 10.
Real estate shocks appear to drive employment costs through the extensive margin (number
of employees) rather than the intensive margin (wages or hours). Our results highlight significant
25Specifically Mian and Sufi find that zip codes with a housing leverage ratio below 30% cut spending on auto sales
by $0.01 for every dollar decline in home value while households with a housing leverage ratio of 90% or higher cut
automobile spending by $0.03.
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wage/hours rigidity despite elevated levels of unemployment26.
Our financially-constrained firms show no evidence of cutting the firm wage relative to uncon-
strained firms. While we find this fact surprising, it actually reinforces standard models of the
wage rate as a price solved for in equilibrium. In this instance real estate shocks should affect the
economy-wide wage, but have no effect on the firm-specific wage. We discuss this effect in detail in
our general equilibrium results below.
Why are Employees Paid Through External Financing?
As emphasized in Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011) standard theory suggests that labor
is paid through the revenues, and as a result financing should not directly affect firm employment
decisions. We first offer simple evidence that this does not appear to be the case. Specificaly, we
develop an empirical measure of the amount of external financing a firm needs to fund investment
and employment. In order for a firm to be able to internally fund employment and investment it is
necessary that
EmpCostit   Invit ¤ Internal Fundsit (2.7)
Internal Fundsit  Revenueit Materialsit  Assetsit Dividends Interestit  Total Debtit
(2.8)
If Equation 2.7 does not hold then the firm will need to rely on a sourcing of external financing.
We are particularly interested in the case where a firm cannot even pay all employment costs with
internal funds.
To determine the percentage of employment that is paid through external financing we use the
formula
°
itpEmpCostit  Internal Fundsitq  1rEmpCostit¥Internal Fundsits°
itpEmpCostitq
(2.9)
Note that investment expenditures does not enter into the equation as we assume firms use
26We refer readers to Daly et al (2011, 2012) and Falick et al (2011) for additional evidence on the subject.
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internal funds for investment only after paying all employment costs. We find that 4.2% of all
employment is paid through external financing. In line with the theory on financial constraints, small
firms pay a full 13.9% of all employment costs with external finances and the effect is monotonically
decreasing with firm size. The largest firms, those with at least 250 employees can afford to pay
over 97% of all employment costs with internal funds. These results highlight that employment can
likely be affected by a large financial shock.
So why are firms unable to pay employees through revenue? Here we consider three standard
explanations. The first explanation is that investment is paid through financing and due to com-
plementarities between labor and capital, employment is also adjusted when capital is increased.
Secondly, there may be a timing mismatch between the generation of cashflow and the employee
payment schedule. Third, fixed costs due to hiring and training new employees or firing costs from
compensation packages may not be easily paid through the revenue stream.
We find strong evidence for each explanation. A $1 increase in capital increases labor demand
by $0.10. Secondly, cashflow does appear highly correlated with employment expenditures. Our
productivity measure-which as discussed before is highly correlated with profitability- is large and
significant at 0.17 and 0.16 for OLS and IV, respectively.
Testing the fixed cost hypothesis is more difficult in our current framework. Previous studies
have found strong support for a fixed cost of hiring and firing rather than a per capita cost or
quadratic costs . For instance, using Compustat data Bloom (2009) finds a high fixed cost of hiring
and firing (2.1% of annual revenue), a smaller per capita cost (1.8% of the individual's wage), and
no quadratic adjustment costs. With this in mind we offer evidence that (i) firms irregularly alter
employment and (ii) hiring is lumpy. First, we find that employment growth exhibits excess kurtosis
relative to the normal distribution, and that in any given year in our sample 12-14% of firms keep
the total number of employees constant. Additionally, given a firm hires at least one new employee,
we find that the firm will actually hire six new employees. Similarly, conditional on firing at least
one employee, the median firm will fire six employees. A complete test of fixed costs requires a
specified structural model and is the current focus of our ongoing research on the small business
collateral channel.
Can the Firm Find Alternative Sources to Finance Employment Costs?
In order for a decline in debt to have any real effect on firm spending our framework requires
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that alternative sources of financing are more costly than debt or unavailable completely. With this
in mind we now offer evidence that the real effects of a real estate shock will be significantly greater
for firms with less access to equity financing. We distinguish between publicly-traded firms and
private firms in our sample and document that in response to a positive collateral effect public firms
increase leverage and investment less than private firms. In Table 11 we find that a $1 increase in
real estate results in a $0.25 increase in debt for private firms but only a $0.11 increase for public
firms. In contrast we find no significant effect on public firm employment. The result implies that
public firms can fully finance employment costs without the debt market, and as a result real estate
shocks have no direct effect on firm employment.
One potential explanation for these results is that measurement error is more pronounced with
public firms, specifically that our real estate proxy may contain more measurement error for public
firms. However, using data from The National Balance Sheet for the UK Office of Statistics we
find that real estate makes up 90.5% of all tangible fixed assets for public firms and only 61.5%
for private firms. Therefore, if anything, we are actually underestimating the collateral channel for
private firms compared to public firms.
Our results can be viewed as a robustness check that the collateral channel is indeed increasing
in the level of firm financial constraints and offers empirical support that private firms face a higher
risk of financial shocks. We argue this is due to differences of ownership and the availability of
financing through equity. Privately-held firms have a concentrated ownership and owners are likely
dependent on the dividends of the firm for consumption. If any owner prefers to smooth consumption
over time he is not willing to delay the dividend payout that could otherwise fund investment and
employment opportunities. As a result the responses of investment and employment to collateral
shocks are amplified. In comparison the publicly-held firms are owned by households that can insure
themselves against the idiosyncratic risk affecting a particular firm. Therefore, the household is
willing to forgo a dividend payout from a firm hit by a large collateral shock. In this way the type
of ownership affects dividend decisions and as a result the effect of financial shocks to the firm.
How do Alternative Model Specifications Affect our Results?
There are a number of key assumptions on our model specification, including (i) collateral
shocks affect employment levels, (ii) firm investment decisions are chosen simultaneously with em-
ployment, (iii) debt contracts are renegotiated yearly, and (iv) productivity is a valid proxy for
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cashflow. We discuss each specification below.
Employment Growth Regression Our analysis has only considered the effect of a real estate
shock to the level of employment costs; however the literature on financial shocks generally focuses
on investment, or the annual change in capital, adjusting for depreciation. In line with this literature
we therefore use the similar specification
∆EmpCostit  β
EReal Estateit   γ
EInvi,t   φ
E
t  θ
E
l   ρ
EProdit   α
Y
i   λ
Y
¸
Xi,0  Plt   εit (2.10)
This specification is particularly reasonable if we believe that changes in employment cost are
driven exclusively by demand for new employees through new investments. Then in this case and
according to our model we should find that the gamma coefficient remains positive and the real
estate shock is not significantly different from zero. We present the results in Table 26 . First,
we find that when excluding investment a $1 in real estate causes a $0.05 in employment growth.
Including investment decreases our result to $0.03 with a coefficient on investment of 0.19.
Allowing for Time-to-Build Next, we note that capital expenditures are determined prior
to employment; therefore employment demand may in fact be driven by lags of capital. In this case
we may overestimate the direct effects of real estate shocks on employment costs.
Therefore we include lags of capital according to the specification
EmpCostit  β
EReal Estateit 
J¸
j0
γEj Capitali,tj φ
Y
t θ
Y
l  ρ
Y Prodit α
Y
i  λ
Y
¸
Xi,0Plt εit (2.11)
Our results appear relatively unchanged; present capital has a coefficient of 0.12 while capital
for one and two years behind are estimated to be 0.014 and 0.013, respectively.
Subsequent Employment Effects Debt financing contracts may not be immediately rene-
gotiated subject to a positive real estate shock. Instead the renegotiation may be a gradual process.
We define our employment as the mean employment cost over the subsequent three years
J¸
j0
EmpCosti,t j  β
EReal Estateit   γ
ECapitali   φ
Y
t  θ
Y
l   ρ
Y Prodit   α
Y
i   λ
Y
¸
Xi,0  Plt   εit (2.12)
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We find the employment coefficient to be highly significant at $0.05 and future capital holdings
to be positive and highly significant.
Cashflow Sensitivity of Employment Finally, standard practice in the corporate finance
literature includes cashflow sensitivity in the regression analysis. While we have offered evidence
that our productivity measure is a related variable we now add cashflow to determine that our results
are not driven by an omitted variable. Not surprisingly, cashflow is highly and positively correlated
with employment costs. A $1 increase in cashflow causes firm to increase total employment costs by
$0.15, yet has little effect on our real estate coefficient.
.
Evaluating the Macroeconomic Implications
With our estimation in hand we are finally able to estimate the aggregate effects of the small
business collateral channel on the the decline in employment in 2007-2009. Doing so requires us to
bridge the gap between the microeconomic results and the macroeconomic implications. We do this
in three steps: (i) we weight our firm sample by firm age, (ii) sum the weighted sample to estimate
aggregate employment effects and (ii) revisit the theoretical model to account for general equilibrium
effects that might alter the final result. We estimate that the small business collateral channel is
responsible for one third of the decline in investment and 8-16% of the decline in UK employment
during 2007-2009 and that accounting for general equilibrium effects only magnify this result.
Partial Equilibrium Employment Effect
Using our firm-level estimates, we are able to calculate the aggregate effect on the population. In
order to do so we must first make two assumptions:
1. The total employment effects equal the weighted sum of the direct employment effects measured
in each cohort
2. Firms do not enter or exit the population after 2002
The first assumption is simple: we use the weighted sum of each cohort estimation to derive the
aggregate effect on the actual population. The second assumption is more involved. Note that due to
our methodology we do not include firms not in business in 2002, and so we are not able to estimate
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the impact of real estate shocks on firms that enter the sample after this date. Therefore we instead
assume that the firm population in the aggregate is static. This second assumption likely results in
an underestimation of the true aggregate impact due our findings that the effect of collateral shocks
on both leverage is greatest for the youngest firms.
Investment Effect due to Collateral Frictions on Capital
We first estimate the investment effects when collateral friction impact capital. We weight the
sample to accurately measure by separating each firm into one of seven size cohorts and weight each
cohort by its relative population in the UK from Table 22.
We find that firms with less than five employees represent 16.4% of employment, firms with
5-9 employees represent 7% of the population, firms with 10-19 employees represent 7% of the
population, firms with 20-49 employees are 8% of the population, firms with 50-99 employees are
5% of the population, and just over half of all employees work for firms with at least 250 employees.
We include the full results in Table 12. We find that the effect of a $1 increase has a similar
effect on all firms, ranging from $0.11 for the smallest firms to $0.08 to firms of 100-249 employees,
and a weighted estimate of $0.09. According to the results, small firms are no more dependent on
collateral to finance investment. We calculate the cumulative expected employment effects of real
estate shocks for all firms in cohort C and then weight the effects using wC
Er∆%Capital2007,2009s  100
wC
°
cPC

βIC  pReal Estatec,2009 Real Estatec,2007q

°
cPC
Capitalc,2007  Capitalc,2009
(2.13)
The collateral channel can explain one-third of the decline in investment during this period. This
major impact is due to the fact that even ex-ante unconstrained firms appear to finance investment
through secured debt27. This is vital to our findings since large firms (defined as firms with at least
250 employees) compose half of the workforce.
Employment Effect due to Collateral Frictions on Capital
Our analysis has found that the decline in real estate can explain 33% of the decline in investment
27Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012) find that even large private firms rely on external financing to pay for 90% of
investments.
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between 2007 and 2009. This affect should also result in a decrease in demand for labor. Similar to
above we calculate the expected employment effects of real estate shocks for all firms in cohort C:
Er∆%Emp2007,2009s  100
wC
°
cPC

βICγ
E
C  pReal Estatec,2009 Real Estatec,2007q

°
cPC
EmpCostc,2009  EmpCostc,2007
(2.14)
To estimate the impact we first multiply the decline in the value of real estate for each cohort by
βI to quantify the impact on investment and secondly multiply by γE to estimate the relationship
between employment and investment spending. A summary of the analysis is included in Table 12.
The average UK firm demand for employment expenditure due to a $1 increase in capital is $.11. It
is interesting to note that for the smallest firms a rise in capital appears to have no direct effect on
employment demand.
In Table 13 we estimate that collateral frictions on investment can explain only 1.2% of the
total decline in employment spending between 2007 and 2009. Using coefficients estimated from
2007-2012 raises the aggregate effect only slightly to 1.5%.
This result is small but not surprising for two reasons. First, a $1 increase in fixed assets
increases employment demand by only $0.11. When we allow for the demand effect in our analysis,
our results appear quite small despite the large direct effects on investment. Secondly, it is important
to distinguish between capital and investment. Between 2007 and 2009 UK investment dropped by
20%, yet this has only a minor effect on total capital. Overall the employment effects due to collateral
frictions on investment are a negligible source of the decline in employment.
Employment Effect due to Collateral Frictions on Employment
In our third and final analysis we test the effect in the case where collateral frictions directly
impact employment. We multiply the real estate value decline by βE from our estimates.
Er∆%Emp20072009s  100 
wC
°
cPC

βEC  pReal Estatec,2009 Real Estatec,2007q

°
cPC
EmpCostc,2009  EmpCostc,2007
(2.15)
In line with our understanding of financial constraints we find that the employment effect is
decreasing in firm size. Firms between 10 and 49 employees have an estimated coefficient of 0.11
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while the largest firms see an effect less than half this size. However, the very smallest firms, those
under ten employees, see little effect from a real estate shock. We attribute this effect to the fact
that the smallest firms are borrowing not against commercial real estate, but instead residential real
estate.
The aggregate effect of the collateral channel on labor explains a full 7.1% of the decline in
aggregate employment spending between 2007 and 2009. Of course our aggregate effect does depend
on both the econometric assumptions and firm sample. First we note that our coefficients are
significantly larger in the 2007-2012 subsample. Specifically, we found a $0.13 increase in employment
costs as opposed to a $0.07 increase in the full sample. Including this estimate increases our aggregate
effect to 14.8%. Next, instrumenting for real estate price growth actually increases our estimate to
11.8%. Alternatively, when we include only firms in the tradable goods sector- minimizing the effect
of consumer demand- we estimate an identical 7%. Using these numbers we pose a lower and upper
bound of 7.1-14.8% on our aggregate estimate.
The Aggregate Effect of the Small Business Collateral Channel
The combined effect of the small business collateral channel explains a full 8.3% of the decline in
employment spending between 2007 and 2009. Using coefficients estimated from 2007-2012 doubles
this estimation to 16%. The estimated effect differs significantly by firm size. The collateral channel
explains 14-24% of the decline for firms with 10-49 employees, yet only 5-11% of the employment
decline for the largest firms.
We also aggregate our results by firm age in Table 12. We find that start-ups (0-1 years of age)
compose 15% of all firms and 8.3% of total employment. Young firms (2-3 years of age) are an
additional 8% of employment and middle-aged firms (4-9 years of age) compose another 19%. The
majority of employment is due to the oldest firms at 65%. Appropriately weighted we find that a
direct effect of $0.07 and an indirect effect of $0.09. The decline in real estate can explain 15-29%
of the total decline in employment for the youngest firms, but 6-12% of the decline for the oldest
firms.
In Table 13 we include the actual employment declines during 2007-2009 for each region in the
United Kingdom and well as the aggregate effects of the decline due to the real estate channel. At
the low end of the spectrum we find the small business collateral channel explains 6.9-13.7% of the
decline in London employment. On the the other extreme Northern Ireland saw both the largest
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real estate gains and the largest subsequent bust. For comparison we plot the house price index for
Northern Ireland with three US cities worst hit by the housing crisis. We find that between 2007 and
2009 Northern Ireland saw a 2.9% decrease in employment spending and according to our estimates
20-37% of this decline is the result of the small business collateral channel.
We compare our estimates to recent related research that links employment to real estate balance
sheet shocks.To our knowledge, we are the first to quantify the implications of small firm collateral
shocks to employment using firm-level data; however, in contemporaneous work Liu, Wang, and Zha
( 2013b) using a general equilibrium model and macroeconomic data to estimate that a 10 percent
drop in the land price leads to a 0.34 percentage point increase of the unemployment rate (relative
to its steady state).Our results find that an 17.4% drop in the real estate price index explains 8-16%
of the total decline in employment spending. Considering that employment declined 2.9% in the
United Kingdom between 2007 and 2009, a back-of-the envelope calculation implies that a 10%
percent drop in prices results in a 0.13-0.27% increase in unemployment.
In a closely related paper Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2013) use county level data and find
that a 1% increase in house price translates to a 0.19% in the total number of small firms (those
with 1-4) employees relative to the largest firms. They attribute this rise to homeowners borrowing
against home equity to form a business, relying on the fact that larger firms will be unable to finance
through home equity alone. They find that the aggregate effect explains a similar 15-25% of the
total employment variation.
We also compare the results to the effects of balance sheet shocks to households and the financial
sector. Using the relation between non-tradable sector job losses and demand shocks and assuming
Cobb-Douglas preferences over tradable and non-tradable goods Mian and Sufi (2012) estimate
that the decline in aggregate demand driven by household balance sheet shocks accounts for 65%
of the lost jobs in our data.Chodorow-Reich (2013) estimates that balance sheet shocks to the
financial sector explains 20-33% of the total decline in unemployment during the 2008 Financial
Crisis. Greenstone and Mas (2013) answer the same question using local US data and find up to
a 20% decline in unemployment. With these estimates in mind, we believe our own results appear
quite reasonable.
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General Equilibrium Employment Effects
Recall that our empirical framework first distinguishes between firms that do and do not own real
estate, and secondly by the level of real estate shock exposure between land-owning firms. Therefore
our aggregate results determine the total change in employment of real estate owning firms relative
to firms that do not own real estate. This is potentially a concern since in equilibrium, real estate
shocks can affect all firms, not just those with real estate.
As we noted earlier a balance sheet shock to constrained firms results in (i) a direct decline in
demand for capital, and (ii) an indirect decline in demand for materials due to production function
complementarities. This demand effect, which will affect all firms in equilibrium, may actually
contribute to the employment effects, causing us to instead underestimate the actual implications
of the small business employment channel.
Alternatively it is possible that we are actually overestimating the implications of the small
business collateral channel. The reason is that the equilibrium fall in the wage or real interest rate
may actually raise the output of unconstrained firms and therefore their labor demand. However,
we are not taking this offsetting effect into account in our empirical framework.
Our current framework is unable to characterize the impact of the demand effect on total em-
ployment. Instead we need a way to address both the demand and price effect in a unified framework
to determine which effect dominates in equilibrium. Therefore we return to the general equilibrium
model of Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012). We assume that firm production is dependent on ma-
terial goods each period, created from the final good. In this case a negative collateral shocks causes
a decline in the demand for the final good due to the complementarities in the production function.
Since intermediate good firms each produce a unique output, the demand for all goods produced
falls. For a complete description of the model and results we refer readers to our appendix and to
the full dynamic model of Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012).
Theoretical Result 3. The decline in firm demand for materials and investment dominates
any price effects from wages. Therefore our empirical results for employment will be magnified when
taking into account general equilibrium effects.
According to our analysis we find that the demand effect does indeed dominate the effect on
wages, causing us to only underestimate the true collateral channel. The result holds under a
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range of reasonable calibrations. We reach this conclusion by determining the equilibrium effects on
financially-unconstrained firms. This result leads us to conclude that the partial equilibrium results
is a reasonable approximation for the total effects in the economy.
Conclusion
The real estate and credit market has been at the center of the debate on the causes and
consequences of the rise in unemployment during 2007-2009, yet the channel linking these financial
shocks to the macroeconomy remains unclear. Our research highlights the small business collateral
channel as a relevant explanation of the recent Great Recession and illustrates business balance sheet
shocks as a primary driver of financial frictions to the economy. For every dollar decrease in the
value of real estate firms will lower their debt $ 0.25. These financial shocks have real implications
for the economy since firms are forced to cut investment and employment expenditures by $0.10
and $0.07, respectively. After appropriately weighting the sample, we find that balance sheet shocks
explain one-third of the decline in investment and 8%-16% of the decline in employment spending
between 2007 and 2009. According to a simple model, accounting for general equilibrium effects is
unlikely to affect our results.
In our online appendix we extend our empirical analysis to US data. Using aggregate data we
first note that during the 2007 recession small US firms reduced their employment twice as much
as large firms, consisent with the implications of a credit shock on constrained firms. We then rely
primarily on two firm-level accounting data sets: (i) publicly-listed firms from Compustat, and (ii)
small start-ups from the Survey of Small Business Owners. According to our analysis a $1,000,000
increase in the value of real estate translates to 0.8 new employees for each public firm. Secondly,
we estimate that real estate price growth between 2002 and 2006 is responsible for an 18% increase
in home equity financing for large start-ups.
This paper is a first attempt to quantify the macroeconomic significance of the small business
collateral channel. Our results beg the more general question: why do firms pay employees through
external financing? One possibility is that firms are unable to directly pay for hiring and firing costs.
In a companion paper we develop a full structural estimation to better examine how fixed costs on
employment drive our results. In addition, while we focus here on the real effects of employment
we note that our empirical framework can be used to study the implications of collateral shocks on
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additional firm characteristics 28.
We believe this research has important implications for small business financing policy. Small
firms are highly dependent on pledgable assets to access external financing, causing an intimate link
between collateral shocks and the macroeconomy. Policies that break this close relationship, such
as loan guarantee programs, have a strong potential in limiting the aggregate effects of a negative
financial shock to firms. Understanding how to best develop these initiatives is a natural next step
in our research agenda.
The small business collateral channel is a potential explanation of the depressed employment
growth not only in the United Kingdom but around the world. In the US real house prices have only
now reached their early 2001 pre-boom levels. At the individual MSA level we find that Atlanta,
Cleveland, and Las Vegas are at 25% and Detroit a full 50% below 2001 levels. The small business
collateral channel implies that local areas worst hit by the housing bust will continue to experience
depressed economies as long as real estate values are also depressed. The purpose of this paper
is not to fully explain the causes of the Great Recession, which is likely a combination of several
economic factors. Instead we first highlight small firm balance sheet shocks as a mechanism to relate
the collapse of the real estate market to the employment. Secondly, and more generally, we lay a
foundation to studying the macroeconomic effects of financial friction of small business.
*
Theory
We develop a tractable model based on the work of Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012) with
two key differences: (i) we focus on firm labor demand as opposed to output, and (ii) we extend the
model to incorporate firm labor demand into the collateral constraint. In our baseline framework we
assume that firms face a collateral constraint and then derive the firm demand for labor in response
to a shock to the collateral constraint. We consider two possible channels for a collateral shock to
impact employment: directly when employment cannot be financed through revenue and indirectly
due to complements between investment and employment in the production function. From the
model we find that only financially-constrained firms increase employment in response to a real
28In ongoing work we relate the productivity loss to the simultaneous decline in credit caused by real estate shocks
to the firm balance sheet for both US and UK firms (Kleiner 2013a).
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estate shock while unconstrained firms see no effect.
We return to the theory when we aggregate the microeconomic result to the macroeconomy,
particularly when we attempt to account for general equilibrium effects due to changes in demand.
A balance sheet shock to constrained firms results in (i) a direct decline in demand for capital, and
(ii) an indirect decline in demand for materials due to production function complementarities. This
demand effect, which will affect all firms in equilibrium, may actually contribute to the employment
effects, causing us to instead underestimate the actual implications of the small business employment
channel. To quantify the demand channel we assume that firm production is dependent on material
goods each period, created from the final good. In this case a negative collateral shocks causes a
decline in the demand for the final good due to the complementarities in the production function.
Since intermediate good firms each produce a unique output, the demand for all goods produced
falls.
Alternatively, our results may actually be overstate the small business collateral channel. The
reason is that an equilibrium fall in the wage or real interest rate may actually raise the output of
unconstrained firms and therefore their labor demand. We allow for the possibility in the model by
including a fully-flexible wage rate.
From our analysis we determine that the impact of general equilibrium is largely determined by
the elasticity of substitution across firms. If each differentiated good is highly substitutable, then
total output depends little on the output of any particular firm. As a result, a financial shock that
affects only a subset of firms have little macroeconomic significance.
Calibrating the model we find that the demand effect dominates any wage effect. As a result,
the partial equilibrium effects are a reasonable approximation to the total employment effects from
the small business collateral channel.
Model 1: Collateral Constraint on Investment
In our economy we include a continuum [0,1] of intermediate good firms along with a single final
goods producer. We assume that intermediate good firms face monopolistic competition and sets
their price pi. A final good firm then purchases inputs from intermediate good firms, taking their
price as given. Denoting the output of the final good producer as Q and the intermediate good
producer i as qi we define final good output using the standard Dixit-Stiglitz production function
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Q 
» 1
0
q
ρ1
ρ
i dF piq
ff ρ
ρ1
(2.16)
The final good producer chooses qi so as to maximize
max
qi
» 1
0
q
ρ1
ρ
i dF piq
ff ρ
ρ1

» 1
0
piqidF piq (2.17)
We derive the standard demand for each intermediate good as
q

1
ρ
i Q
1
ρ  pi (2.18)
Each intermediate good firm i P r0, 1s has a net worth of ai and productivity zi and pai, ziq is
distributed according to the function F pa, zq. While not explicitly modeled, we assume that net
worth includes the current value of firm i real estate holdings.
In addition each firm rents capital, k, and hires labor, l, and purchases materials, I, composed
of the final good
qi  z
1
1ρ
i pk
αl1αqηI1η (2.19)
As is standard in the literature we assume that the firm may rent capital, but only up to a
constant of the firm's net worth, k ¤ θai where θ ¥ 1. As mentioned in Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones
(2012) this collateral constraint can be rationalized in a more complicated model based on limited
enforcement29.
Definition 1. A firm is defined as financially constrained in investment if the collateral
constraint binds, k  θai.
The profit function, along with the constraints, for each intermediate good i firm is defined as
29This collateral constraint can be easily derived from a dynamic model that includes debt. Consider a firm with debt
holdings dt and capital kt that must choose investment xt subject to the financial constraint: dt xt ¤
1
1 θ
pkt xtq.
By defining net worth as at  kt  dt we can derive the collateral constraint kt   xt ¤ θat.
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pii  max
k,l,I,pi
piz
1
1ρ
i pkl
1αqηI1η  wl  rk  I   rai (2.20)
subject to
pi  Q
1
ρ

z
1
1ρ
i pk
αl1αqηI1η
ff 1ρ
(2.21)
k ¤ θai (2.22)
By assuming monopolistic competition we impose that the revenue function of each firm exhibits
decreasing returns to scale. This means that revenue is directly increasing in zi and as a result
capital is increasing in productivity. With this is mind we can then define a threshold apz; pkq; firms
with a net worth above the threshold, ai ¥apzq, will be financially-unconstrained in capital while
firms with a net worth below this threshold will be financially-constrained. Since our framework is
static, any unconstrained firm will choose capital as if no collateral constraints exists.
The optimal capital decision of firm i is
kpa, zq 
$''&''%
rνp1  ηqs
p1ηqν
1ν
 
αην
r
1 αην1ν νp1αqη
w
	 p1αqην
1ν
Qz if ai ¥ apzq
θai if ai   apzq
(2.23)
where ν  ρ1ρ . Research on the real impacts of firm collateral constraints has focused primarily
on investment effects, while largely disregarding the effects on labor demand. However, here we
show that the firm demand for labor is also affected
wl  rνp1  ηqs
p1ηqν
1p1αηqν νp1  αqη
1p1ηqν
1p1αηqνw
2p1ηqvp1αηqv
1p1αηqν pQzq
p1νq
1p1αηqν k
ανη
1p1αηqν (2.24)
Using Equation 2.24 we therefore find that a negative shock to the value of real estate decreases
constrained firm labor demand even though firm hiring is not subject to a collateral restriction.
The mechanism is as follows: a tightening of the collateral constraint restricts the firm demand for
capital and due to the complementarities of capital and labor in the production function constrained
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firms also decrease their labor demand. Therefore constrained firms cut labor demand in response
to a decrease in the value of their real estate.
Model 2: Collateral Constraint on Labor
We next consider an identical model with one exception. We replace the collateral constraint on
capital with a collateral constraint on labor
wl ¤ λai (2.25)
Definition 2. A firm is defined as financially-constrained in labor when wl  λai.
In this we case we can still solve for the optimal labor decision of the firm
wlpai, ziq 
$''&''%
rνp1  ηqs
p1ηqν
1ν pp1  αqηνq
1 
p1αqην
1ν w
p1αqην
1ν
 
ναη
r
αην
1ν Qz if ai ¥ apzq
λai if ai   apzq
(2.26)
Relationship to the Empirical Model According to the theoretical model the effect of a
real estate collateral shock depends on: (i) the net worth of the firm and the collateral parameter,
(ii) the economy-wide output, interest rate, and wage, and (iii) the firm productivity- and implies
the following style regression. From the theory we derive the empirical framework
Capitalitlooooomooooon
logpkq
 βCRealEstateitlooooooooooomooooooooooon
κ1logpλaiq
  φCt  θ
C
lloooomoooon
κ2logpwq κ3logprq κ4logpQq
  ρCProductivityit   α
C
ilooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
κ5 κ6logpziq
  λI
¸
Xi,0  Plt   ε
C
it (2.27)
Real Estateit  Pltlomon
λ
Real EstateHoldingsi,0looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
ai
(2.28)
Capital is the total capital holdings for firm i in period t. As in our theoretical model we evaluate
the effect of an exogenous shock to the net worth of firm i on employment costs. For this exogenous
shock we use changes in the market value of real estate holdings. In our theoretical model the
collateral shock, λ, is the price of local real estate and the initial net worth of the firm, ai, are real
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estate holdings in the first period of our sample. In addition we condition on capital in the analysis
so we can distinguish between a firm financially-constrained in capital from one constrained in labor.
Theory dictates that employment is dependent on the economy-wide characteristics of the wage
rate, the interest rate, and total production. It is critical to control for these factors in our analysis
since the real estate shock affects all firms collectively through equilibrium effects. For instance a
negative shock to net worth results to a decrease in the labor demands of financially-constrained
firms; however, this affect will also cause an decrease in the equilibrium wage rate and can actually
lead to an increase in the labor demand of unconstrained firms. In practice employment is likely
influenced by any number of unobservable variables. Therefore we instead include time fixed effects
φ interacted with location l fixed effects. In this specification we absorb all unobserved variation
within a single location in a particular time period.
Additionally our theoretical model implies firm labor decision is dependent on the firm produc-
tivity and so included in the regression. Of course productivity is an unobservable characteristic that
cannot be easily calculated. Therefore we also allow for unobserved firm heterogeneity by including
firm fixed effects α30.
To directly test the implications on employment we include a similar framework focusing on Emp
Cost, the annual employment costs for firm i at time t. The analysis follows the previous set-up
with the exception that we include Capital in the empirical regression. By doing so we are able to
distinguish between real estate shocks that affect employment indirectly through investment, and
shocks that directly affect the firm's ability to pay employment costs
EmpCostitlooooooomooooooon
logpwlq
 βERealEstateitlooooooooooomooooooooooon
χ1logpλaiq
 γECapitalitloooooooomoooooooon
χ2logpkq
  φEt  θ
E
lloooomoooon
χ3logpwq χ4logprq χ5logpQq
 ρEProductivityit   α
E
ilooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
χ6 χ7logpziq
 λE
¸
Xi,0Plt εit
(2.29)
Household Sector Returing to the model we assume the representative household provides the
labor to produce intermediate goods and purchases the final good. We assume consumer have
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (GHH) preferences and choose labor and consumption
30Of course allowing for firm fixed effects is not sufficient if unobservable productivity is actually changing over
time. For instance in the case where logpzitq  logpzit1q  it we have logpzitq  logpzioq 
°
ij . Then we can think
of the firm fixed effect α as representing logpzioq.
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max
C,L
1
1γ

C  ψ L
1 ε
ε
p 1 εε q

1γ
(2.30)
subject to
C ¤ wL 
» 1
0
piidF piq (2.31)
We note that relying on GHH preferences abstracts from possible wealth effects on the labor-
leisure tradeoff. However, the assumption is necessary for the tractable analysis below.
Given our focus on regional or city real estate markets, we assume a small, open economy and a
competitive labor market. Therefore the wage level w is solved in equilibrium while the interest rate
r is given. While we are abstracting from an equilibrium real interest rate, we note that the Federal
Funds rate has been pinned near zero since 2009 and so this assumption may not actually be too
far off from reality. A number of recent papers have emphasized the effects of the zero lower bound
where leveraged households are forced to decrease consumption due to a reduction in borrowing
capacity. This research includes Eggertson and Krugman (2012), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2012),
and Hall (2011).
Market Clearing We assume that firm capital is subject to the collateral constraint k ¤ θai.
The intuition for the case where firm employment is subject to a collateral constraint is similar.
Then the market clearing conditions require that
» 1
0
lidF piq  L (2.32)
C  
»
i
IidF piq  Q (2.33)
We can then define the competitive equilibrium of the economy as the settki, li, Ii, pi, c, L,Q,wu
that satisfies the market clearing conditions, firm production decisions and household sector deci-
sions.
Next we define labor demand as a function of the equilibrium wage, aggregate output, and firm
output
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l 

p1αqην
w
	
Q1νqν (2.34)
Then the optimal aggregate demand is
»
lGpda, dzq 

p1αqην
w
	
Q1ν
»
qvGpda, dzq 

p1αqην
w
	
Q (2.35)
Model Solution As proven in Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012): the wage rate, w, is increasing in
θ, the collateral parameter on investment. The theorem follows because a relaxing of the collateral
constraint increases aggregate capital demand and so labor demand, causing the wage to rise in
equilibrium. This then implies that in all instances aggregate employment is increasing in the wage
rate and therefore in θ. The pro-cyclicality of real wage growth has been documented by several
authors. Daly, Hobijn, and Wiles (2012) find that a one percent increase in the unemployment rate
reduces real wage-growth of individuals by about 1.3 percentage points. This pattern holds across
decades and for various subpopulations of the labor market.
From the definition of labor supply and the market clearing condition
»
lGpda, dzq  ψεwε (2.36)
Therefore no matter the specific parameter calibration aggregate employment is increasing in
the collateral constraint even when accounting for equilibrium effects. By applying our Theorem we
can test if the equilibrium affects will cause us to over or underestimate the small business collateral
channel.
To do this we need to characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for a negative collateral
shock to decline employment among even financially-unconstrained firms. In this instance our results
will actually underestimate the true impact of a real estate shock on total employment. We determine
the output of a financially-unconstrained firm
q 

νp1αqη
w
	ηp1αq
1ν
pνp1  ηqq
1η
1ν
 
αην
r
 αη
1ν Qzν (2.37)
The optimal labor demand of the unconstrained firm is then solved explicitly
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l 

p1  αqην
w


Q1νqν  pνp1  αqηq
ηp1αq
1ν pνp1ηqq
1η
1ν
 
αην
r
 αη
1ν Qzνwp1 εqp2νq
ηp1αq 1ν
1ν
(2.38)
Finally, using the labor market clearing and the fact that household labor supply is simply
ψεwεwe derive
Q  ψεpp1  αqηνq1w1 ε (2.39)
Using Equation 2.37 and 2.39 we note that that the output of firms depends on the wage rate
and aggregate output which is also a function of the wage rate. Therefore the output of a financially-
unconstrained firm in increasing in λ when 1   ε ¥ ηρp1  αq. We find that the labor demand of a
financially-unconstrained firm is solely a function of the equilibrium wage rate as well as exogenous
productivity which does not depend on the collateral parameter. Therefore to understand the
equilibrium effects of a collateral shock on financially-unconstrained firms, we need to determine the
sensitivity of employment to the equilibrium wage rate. Extending the analysis of Shourideh and
Zetlin-Jones (2012) to consider the labor implications we introduce our key result.
Lemma 1. b) Employment of financially-unconstrained firms is increasing in the collateral
parameter when
ε ¡ pρ 1qηp1  αq (2.40)
This result follows easily from equation 2.39. We can explain this intuitively. Recall that there
are two opposing mechanisms at play in our analysis: a price effect, and a demand effect. The price
effect is largely determined by two variables: the labor supply elasticity, ε, and the labor share in
the production function, 1 α. In comparison, the demand effect is determined by ρ, the elasticity
of substitution, and η, the share of materials goods in the production function.
We first discuss the price effect. Note that a high labor supply elasticity implies households are
very responsive to a fall in the wage rate. Therefore when the real estate price drops, the wage
rate declines only minimally in equilibrium, and financially-unconstrained firms face little positive
benefit from a collateral shock. Next, when we assume firms have a high share of capital in production
relative to labor, then there is minimal benefit to a decline in wages to unconstrained firms.
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The intuition for the demand effect is as follows. First, the collateral channel is decreasing in
the elasticity of substitution across firms/ goods. Understand that when intermediate goods are not
easily substitutable then there are large spillovers from a collateral shock since the demand for all
goods will decline. Finally, a high η implies a large labor share relative to material goods, and so
a larger benefit to the decline in wages. In addition, when the material good share is small, then
the demand effect is also minimized and reinforces the first result. Combined, the share of material
goods in production has particularly large implications on the general equilibrium effects.
This result hightlights the significance of the elasticity of substitution in our analysis. Unique
to our model is the inclusion of the demand effect on employment: here we find that this demand
effect diminishes when firms can easily substitute one intermediate good for another.
We first estimate/calibrate the model parameters as in Table 27 . We estimate the materials
good share, 1 η, at 0.70, implying η=0.30. The labor share is estimated to be 0.28, which implies
an α of 0.053. The result are fairly constant across time and by industry, although the capital share
is slightly higher for manufacturing.
Our other parameters are calibrated from previous estimations and follow the calibrations in the
original model of Shourideh and Zetlin-Jones (2012). The intertemporal aggregate elasticity required
to match business cycle data is between 2.61 (Ok-Cho and Cooley 1994) and 4 (King and Rebelo
1999) in real business cycle models and 1.92 in menu cost models (Smets and Wouters 1999).We
use the mean hours elasticities implied by these three models of 2.84. Finally, Burstein and Hellwig
(2008) and Rossi, Chevalier, and Kashyap (2003) use micro-level data and find that the elasticity of
substitution across intermediate good producers,ρ  11ν , is 4.
In our baseline specification we indeed find that ε  pρ  1qηp1  αq=1.99>0. In Table 27 we
consider a wide range of alternative parameter values. We find that employment of financially-
unconstrained firms is increasing in collateral value over all parameter values. This result similarly
holds for the output of unconstrained firms. We conclude that accounting for the effects of general
equilibrium only magnifies our results, further validating the small business collateral channel.
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*Olley-Pakes Productivity Methodology
Here we extend the Olley-Pakes Productivity methodology to allow for material cost. Olley-
Pakes (1996) developed a simple strategy to estimate productivity in the face of three econometric
concerns:
1. Endogeneity of inputs since outputs and inputs are chosen in the same period
2. firms exit the population due to selection
3. unobserved permanent differences across firms causing serial productivity
Our analysis implies the production function:
logpqitq 
1
1ρ logpzitq   ηαlogpkitq   p1  ηqp1  αqlogplitq   p1  ηqlogpIitq (2.41)
Erlogpqitq | lit, kitIit, Survivals 
1
1ρErlogpzitq | lit, kit, Iit, Survivals   ηαlogpkitq   p1  ηqp1  αqlogplitq   p1  ηqlogpIitq
(2.42)
From Pakes (1994) we know that (nonzero) investment is strictly increasing in productivity given
kit, so we have zit  htpxit, kitq where xit is investment for firm i in period t. Now we can correct
for the simultaneity bias using the regression:
logpqitq  βllogplitq   βI logpIitq   χpxit, kitq   εit (2.43)
where χpxit, kitq is a polynomial function of x and k. The estimates on labor and materials will
be lower now since we corrected for the downward bias in capital. We now have an estimate of
η  1  βI and βl  ηp1  αq or α  1  βl{p1  βIq.
We can then estimate
logpqitq  βllogplitq  βI logpIitq  βo   βkkit   Erlogpzitq | zit1, Survivials   ζit   εit (2.44)
Since Erlogpzitq | zit1, Survivials is a function of both the unobserved firm productivity (lagged)
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and the survival probability we use the two standard instruments in the literature: χpxit, kitqβkkit
and estimated probability of survival. We estimate the survival probability using a standard probit
model as a function of investment and capital.
We include the final estimates of the production function parameters in Table 15.We estimate
the materials good share, 1  η, at 0.70, implying η=0.30. The labor share is estimated to be 0.28,
which implies an α of 0.053. The result are fairly constant across time and by industry, although
the capital share is slightly higher for manufacturing.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Firms from the Bureau van Dijks Amadeus Dataset 2002-2012. All
variables are taken as a ratio over total assets.
Mean Median P25 P75 Min Max N
Revenue 1.89 1.61 0.967 2.42 0.000288 25.9 94973
Profits before Taxes 0.0485 0.0482 0.00355 0.112 -1.1 1.27 94973
Investment 0.0493 0.0221 0.00185 0.0616 -0.0781 0.75 94973
Materials Cost 0.978 0.664 0.219 1.32 -0.919 9.15 94973
Employment Costs 0.408 0.298 0.169 0.494 0.0016 4.83 94973
Total Debt 0.691 0.653 0.456 0.836 0.00178 2.59 94973
Long-Term Debt 0.138 0.0245 0 0.174 0 1.4 94973
Other Non-current Debt 0.0439 0.011 0.000711 0.0407 0 1.02 94973
Short-Term Loans 0.189 0.102 0.025 0.259 0 1.48 94973
Trade Credit 0.152 0.11 0.042 0.219 0 0.666 94973
Other Current Debt 0.161 0.112 0.0606 0.207 0 0.998 94973
Cash 0.11 0.0503 0.00831 0.153 0.0000382 0.991 94973
Equity 0.282 0.354 0.166 0.562 -0.294 0.927 94973
Capital 0.284 0.207 0.0712 0.428 0 0.98 94973
Value of Real Estate 0.459 0.301 0.102 0.639 0 4.68 94973
Price Index 1.5 1.43 1.32 1.68 1 2.75 94973
Table 2: External Financing Summary Statistics. We calculate the percent of employment costs
that can not be financed through internal funds.
Size Cohort % of Emp Cost Paid through External Financing
<5 Emp 13.9%
5-9 Emp 9.6%
10-19 Emp 6.5%
20-49 Emp 4.9%
50-99 Emp 3.9%
100-249 Emp 3.5%
> 249 Emp 2.9%
Total Sample 4.2%
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Table 14: Evaluation of the Effects of the 2007-2009 Recession on Small Firms. The second and
third column denote the mean value for each variable; the fourth column estimates the percentage
decline between the 2007 and 2009 values.
Variable 2007 2009 %∆
Price 1.796 1.483 -17.4%
Value of Real Estate 0.474 0.437 -7.8%
Investment 0.0485 0.0389 -19.8%
Employee Cost 0.415 0.385 -7.23%
Materials Cost 1.42 1.31 -8.40%
Profit 0.0815 0.0582 -28.8%
Revenue 1.948 1.790 -8.11%
Debt 0.706 0.625 -13.0%
Long Term Debt 0.136 0.124 -8.8%
Other Non-Current Debt 0.0457 0.0461 0.87%.
Short Term Loans 0.192 0.168 -12.5%
Trade Credit 0.153 0.133 -13.1%
Other Current Debt 0.179 0.154 -16.2%
Table 15: Regression of Revenue on Input Production Factors using the Olley-Pakes Semi-Parametric
Method. We use * to denote significance at the 10% level, ** to denote significance at the 5% level,
and *** to denote significance at the 1% level.
Revenue
Employment Cost 0.284***
(240.3)
Materials Cost 0.700***
(677.8)
Capital 0.0162***
(23.3)
N 94,973
Table 16: Regression of the LPA Real Estate Price Index on our Government Regulatory Restraint
Measure. This is the first-stage result for our IV estimation. Our instrument for real estate price
growth is Refusal Rate{It defined as the interaction of the LPA refusal rate of major real estate
projects over the 30-year conventional mortgage rate. We use * to denote significance at the 10%
level, ** to denote significance at the 5% level, and *** to denote significance at the 1% level.
LPA Real Estate Price Index
Refusal Rate{It 0.350***
(5.43)
Year Fixed Effects Yes
LPA Fixed Effects Yes
N 55,187
R2 0.947
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Table 17: Correlation between Productivity, Revenue, Profits, and Return on Assets. We define
Productivity as the residual of the Production Function Regression. Revenue is defined as Revenue
over lagged total assets, Profitability is defined as Profit before Taxes over lagged total assets, and
Return on Assets is net income over lagged total assets.
Productivity Revenue Profitability Return on Assets
Productivity 1
Revenue .11 1
Profitability .22 .21 1
Return on Assets .21 .14 .87 1
Table 19: Real Estate Balance Sheet Summary Statistics from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds.
This table offers a comparison between the real estate owning for US and UK firms during the
2012 fiscal year. Estimates of the Market Value of real estate are shown on the balance sheet; the
estimates are from the FFA and are calculated using real estate price indices and net investment
from BEA.
Corporate Noncorporate Total
Total Assets (in Billions) 31,618.8 13,849.3 454,68.1
Non-Financial Assets at Market Value 15,857.4 10,050.4 25,907.8
Real Estate at Market Value 9,327.8 9,111.3 18,439.1
Real Estate/Non-Financial Assets 58.8% 90.7% 71.2%
Real Estate/Total Assets 29.5% 65.8% 40.6%
Table 20: Worldscope Summary Statistics on the Subcomponents of Property, Plant and Equipment
(PPE). Real Estate is defined as the sum of land ownings, construction in progress, and buildings.
Mean Median St Dev P25 P75 N
Real Estate as a Fraction of PPE 0.285 0.170 0.314 0.00 0.522 3206
Real Estate Owner (0,1) 0.724 1 0.447 0 1 5348
Real Estate as Fraction of PPE if Owner 0.529 0.499 0.236 0.35 0.708 1729
Other PPE as a Fraction of PPE 0.383 0.164 0.415 0.00 0.908 3206
Capital Leases as a Fraction of PPE 0.002 0.000 0.022 0.00 0.000 3206
Machinery as a Fraction of PPE 0.287 0.160 0.320 0.00 0.525 3206
Transportation as a Fraction of PPE 0.041 0.000 0.142 0.00 0.006 3206
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Table 21: Correlation Matrix between the UK Commercial and Residential Real Estate Index. The
Residential data is the Halifax House Price Index from Lloyds Banking Group and is derived from
mortgage data from the nation's largest mortgage provider. The Commercial data is from the FTSE
Commercial Property Index Series and are further broken into three subgroups: Retail Index, Office
Index, and Industrial Index.
Residential Commercial Retail Office Industrial
Residential 1
Commercial 0.9259 1
Retail 0.9273 0.9973 1
Office 0.8977 0.9727 0.9532 1
Industrial 0.9418 0.9833 0.9874 0.9372 1
Table 22: Data on the Number of Firms in the UK, in the AMADEUS Dataset, and in the Sample
Separated by Firm Size and Firm Age.
Actual AMADEUS Data Sample
Cohort Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
< 5 Emp 1579840 76 3466 8 942 9.9
5-9 Emp 267950 13 2456 6 189 2.0
10-19 Emp 124440 6 4319 10 530 5.5
20-49 Emp 66445 3 8830 21 1769 18.5
50-99 Emp 21575 1 8937 21 2647 27.7
100-249 Emp 11980 0.6 8272 19 2368 24.8
>249 Emp 8630 0.4 6447 15 1973 20.7
Total 2080860 100 42727 100 9552 100
Cohort Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
< 2 Year 305590 15 1582 4 952 10.0
2-3 Years 270145 13 2630 6 831 8.7
4-9 Years 579300 28 9748 23 1909 19.9
> 10 Years 925825 45 28767 67 5860 61.3
Total 2080860 100 42727 100 9552 100
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Table 23: Prediction of initial Real Estate Holdings on observable firm characteristics.
Real Estate Holdings
Total Assets Fixed Effects
F-Stat 474.89
p-value 0.0000
Employment Fixed Effects
F-Stat 28.34
p-value 0.0000
Material Costs Fixed Effects
F-Stat 265.76
p-value 0.0000
Return on Capital Fixed Effects
F-Stat 7.78
p-value 0.0008
Firm Age Fixed Effects
F-Stat 77.46
p-value 0.0000
NAICS Code Fixed Effects
F-Stat 5.75
p-value 0.0025
Local Planning Authority Fixed Effects
F-Stat 32.79
p-value 0.0000
N 10,910
R2 0.424
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Figure 2.1: Real Estate Price Growth and Government Regulation.
Figure 2.2: Regression of Real Estate Value and Debt Decisions by Firm Age. This table reports
the estimate and 95% confidence interval for separate regressions for each firm age group. Groups
are based on the age of the firm in 2002. All columns includes YearLocal Planning Authority fixed
effects. All specifications cluster observations at the YearRegion level.
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Figure 2.3: US Credit Market Liabilities Index. This figure displays an index of the following
variables from 1995-2013: (i) US Household and Nonprofit Organization Credit Market Instrument
Liabilities/US GDP, (ii) US Nonfinancial Noncorporate Business Credit Market Instrument Liabili-
ties/ US GDP, and (iii)US Nonfinancial Corporate Business Credit Market/ US GDP. Each variable
is indexed to be 100 in the first quarter of 2000. Financial data is collected from the Federal Reserve
Board Flow of Funds and GDP data is from the National Income and Product Accounts. As of
the first quarter of 2013 Household Liabilities/GDP = 0.77, Corporate Liabilities/GDP = 0.54, and
Noncorporate Liabilities were 0.24. In comparison in the first quarter of 2009, these number were
Household Liabilities =0.94, and Corporate Liabilities= 0.52, and Nonorporate Liabilities/GDP =
0.28, .
Figure 2.4: Comparison of Northern Ireland Housing Price Index with Three Boom-Bust US Cities.
Each price index is set at 100 in the first quarter of 2007 during the height of the Northern Ireland
housing boom.
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3 How Case-Shiller got it Wrong: the Effect of Market Con-
ditions on Price Indices
Introduction
Many assets (i) sell infrequently and (ii) are not interchangeable. For instance, real estate comprises
the majority of household wealth and over two-thirds of all firm non-financial assets, yet each prop-
erty is unique and may not be solved for many years. Similarly, there is only a small market for
commercial airplanes and railroad equipment, yet these assets are necessary to value for the producer
price index. Even more important is the valuation of risky human capital. Obviously, these assets
are particularly important; however, due to this market illiquidity we are not able to accurately
value these individual assets. As a result, empirical research on individual illiquid assets has lagged
behind more traditional asset pricing topics.
To overcome these issues the standard approach in the literature is to instead aggregate assets to
develop a price index, a technique best known in the real estate finance literature. Research in this
area has long documented significant cross-sectional heterogeneity among real estate prices across
cities, and as a result house price indices are generally have been developed at a local level. These
same indices, however, allow for no role in diverse returns within a local area as they require at least
one of these conditions to hold: (i) houses with a city exhibit the same price process, or (ii) there is
no variation over the business cycle in the composition of houses that are sold.
With this in mind, the purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we offer evidence of significant
change in both the composition and price dispersion among houses with US metropolitan areas
between 2002 and 2006. Secondly, to deal with these complications we develop a new technique to
price any illiquid asset at all time periods; summing the price indices results in an aggregate price
index robust to both heterogeneous returns and changing market composition. Third, we apply our
new approach to the US housing market to quantify and correct mismeasurement in traditional US
house price indices.
We first document the need for a price index that is robust to changing composition and price
dispersion patterns. We break metropolitan houses into subsets based on initial price. We find
that during the 2002-2006 US housing boom, low tier housing grew up to twice as fast as high tier
housing in certain cities. Similarly, these same houses began to sell significantly more often, affecting
the composition of transactions in the market. Using detailed credit data at the household level,
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we offer simple evidence that both effects are driven by changing credit conditions for low income
homebuyers. From the data, it is clear that we need a price index robust to these changing market
conditions.
According to this result, price indices may be mismeasured due to changes in the market com-
position over the business cycle. We believe the simplest solution to this concern is simply keep the
composition of assets static: therefore we need a way to value assets even if they are not being sold
that particular time period.
Secondly, to achieve this goal we develop a simple but important refinement of the Case-Shiller
method that provides heterogeneous estimates of the return series for any given asset, even those
that never sell during the sample period. We label our method the locally-weighted repeat sales
estimation strategy. The technique works as follows: we first take any given asset and compare the
characteristics of our asset to the characteristics of all similar assets sold that time period. This
gives us a weight that we can use in a standard least squares estimation.
In addition to providing unbiased metropolitan-level price indices, estimates of the underlying
heterogeneous returns themselves open up several potential new lines of inquiry for the literature.
These heterogeneous returns series provide a straightforward tool for characterizing aspects of hous-
ing price dynamics that the literature has not yet explored, for example: (i) the extent of variation
in returns within metropolitan housing markets at various points in the business cycle, (ii) linking
local productivity shocks to returns in different segments of the market, (iii) covariation in returns
across classes of assets both within and across metropolitan markets, (iv) heterogeneity in returns
across different classes of assets over the business cycle, and (v) the extent of positive momentum in
housing returns at this more disaggregate level. To highlight the applicability of our estimation we
focus on the practical implementation of these latter two topics.
Third, we apply our estimation technique to the housing market. Houses that are more similar-
in terms of lot size, age, location, or square footage- are given more weight in the estimation, and
the end result is a price index for our specific house. By explicitly aggregating estimated returns for
the full census of houses in the metropolitan area to form the metro index, our approach naturally
deals with the selection issues that arise in the standard application of repeat sales estimators
We find that beginning in 2004 the Case-Shiller type index substantially overstates the peak of
the housing bubble by 10%. On closer inspection we find that the discrepancy is indeed due to the
fact that high demand houses in the lowest value quartile generally sell more frequently (and so are
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over-represented in the repeat sales sample).
There is already a large empirical literature on constructing price indices for illiquid and het-
erogeneous assets, and much of this work has been directly applied to estimating local real estate
values. Original techniques only estimated the median house price in a region. However, economists
quickly realized the need to separate between changes in price and changes in quality., and as a
result more advanced repeat sales method were developed so that we only compare price changes
of the same property (Case and Shiller 1987)1. Repeat sales estimation strategies have their own
shortcomings. First, because unique houses may have distinct price paths from the overall market,
these aggregate price indices are not able to characterize an individual property. Secondly, these
methods are biased towards the frequently sold houses2. As we illustrate below our locally-weighted
repeat sales technique overcomes both limitations.
Secondly, a separate line of research has attempted to test and explain the correlation between
house price growth and turnover. There is evidence at both national and regional level that turnover
is greatest during periods of high price growth. One explanations for this is that homebuyers pay
the down payment through the returns on their previous house (Stein 1995, Ortalo-Magne and Rady
2006). Other papers suggest the result is due to Search and Matching Frictions (Wheaton 1990, Ngai
and Tenreyro 2010), while a third literature relies on Behavioral explanations such as the Disposition
Effect (Genesove and Mayer 2001). We add to this area by offering documenting that the correlation
between turnover and price growth is also strong at the intra-city level.
More generally, this paper brings these two literatures together: we illustrate that due to the
correlation between turnover and price growth, local price indices will overestimate price booms.
We are the first to examine, correct, and quantify the role of housing market conditions on house
price indices.
The remainder of the paper is developed as follows. Section 2 introduces the locally-weighted
repeated sales technique. Section 4 introduces our particular real estate datasets used in the analysis
and then applies our estimation technique. Section 5 explores the use of the estimation technique
to overcome bias in the price index. Section 6 concludes.
1Other techniques to separate price and quality include: hedonic models (Rosen 1974, Bajari et al 2012) and latent
price models (Epple et al 2013).
2Other indices that have attempted to control for this second critique include hedonic repeated measures method
by Shiller (1993) and the distance-weighted repeat sales procedure by Goetzmann and Spiegel (1997).
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Methodology
In this section, we first illustrate how market conditions may result in mismeasurement in traditional
price indices, and secondly develop a new estimation technique robust to this criticism. We specifi-
cally, we introduce the locally-weighted repeated sales technique, a method to value of every house
in our sample using a unique micro level dataset. We first determine the local weights by comparing
the characteristics of our house to the characteristics of all houses sold that quarter. Then using the
weights we use least squares to create a price index for our specific house. Aggregating the price
indices for all houses in the sample leads to a city-level housing index. We compare the approach to
the standard repeat-sales approach in a simple simulation exercise.
Traditional Price Indices
We first discuss the standard econometrics of traditional price indices before introducing the advan-
tages of our new technique. Initially, indices measured the median price growth within a location;
however, given researcher quickly realized that the house supply is likely changing over time and
as a result simple price indices cannot distinguish price growth from supply changes. To deal with
these complications the literature has focused primarily on two strategies to estimate housing price
indexes: the hedonic method and the repeat-sales method.
First, the hedonic method attempts to statistically control for differences in the characteristics of
housing units. By including house population characteristics it is possible to control for a changing
population. Though this is a major advance over the median sales index, hedonic methods are still
fundamentally biased as we cannot include all characteristics as hedonic variables. In other words,
the lack of house fixed effects implies that unobservable house characteristics may still be driving
the price growth.
The standard alternative is the repeated-sales approach, which only uses data on properties that
have sold more than once in the sample; this is the method used to construct the current Case-
Shiller Price Indices. The advantage of this approach over the hedonic approach is that does not
rely on accurately measuring the quality of housing. Instead, house fixed effects are included in
the regression; therefore we can account for all observable and unobservable house characteristics as
long as the individual house does not receive additions or renovations over time.
Econometrically, the existing literature uses the sample of all repeated sales JS to estimate price
indices (which can be turned into return series) in one of a number of equivalent ways. First, one
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can set up a regression of log prices on house fixed effects and time dummies:
lnppjpsqq  ξj   ωs   εjpsq (3.1)
.
Because house fixed effects,ξ, are included in this regression, only houses that sell multiple times
help in identifying the price index and so only repeat sales need be used to estimate equation . It is
straightforward to construct a price index and measure returns. Following estimation, a price index
pi is formed by exponentiating the time effects estimated above: pit  e
ωt ; thus rt k,t 
pit kpit
pit
.
Now imagine that each repeat sales sold exactly twice at time periods s1 and s2 so that the
transactions for house j could be denoted as jps2q andjps2q. Then an alternative way to estimate
equation 3.1 would be to first-difference these observations to form:
lnppjps2qq  lnppjps1qq  ωs2  ωs1   εs2  εs1 (3.2)
OLS estimates of the time fixed effects ωt in equations 3.1 and 3.2 would be identical.
If some houses sell more than twice, one can also take differences between successive repeat
sales of house j to form observations, estimating a first-differenced specification equivalent to .
Appropriately weighted, this approach can be used to return exactly the same estimates as in
equation 3.1. Following estimation, a price index and returns series can be formed in exactly the
same way as in the first approach.
The construction of the S\&P Case-Shiller indices is based on a variant of the estimation of
equation 3.2. In particular, weighted least squares is used to place more weight on high value
observations and less on observations when the time between sales is longer. Value weighting is used
because the stated goal of these indices is to provide an estimate of the return on the total value of
housing in the metropolitan area3. For the purposes of the discussion here, the essential feature of
the standard Case-Shiller approach to estimating price indices is that it is based exclusively on the
estimated time fixed effects from a regression that includes only properties that sell multiple times
during the sample period.
3Weighting based on time between sales is done because the return on such properties is noisier. This type of
weighting can be incorporated into either of the approaches described above.
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Despite its prevalence, the estimated Case-Shiller index will be a proper price index only if one
of the following two conditions hold: (i) the subset of houses that sell at each point in time is
representative of the housing stock as a whole or (ii) the return process is homogeneous for all of
the houses in the metropolitan area. Yet, as we will show both assumptions are clearly rejected in
the data. Because returns are heterogeneous and only a selected subset of houses sells at each point
in time, a clear selection problem still arises in constructing price indices. Developing a method to
overcome this concern is the purpose of the next subsection*.
Locally-Weighted Repeat Sales Technique
We now introduce a new estimation strategy, the locally-weighted repeat sales (LWRS) technique.
Our method can improve over the Case-Shiller Housing Price Index since our method is not de-
pendent on which houses are currently sold at any given quarter. By weighting transactions each
quarter by housing attributes, we can control for heterogeneity in the market, and so we are able to
resolve the selection problem in the Case-Shiller Index.
Due to the natural heterogeneity in the housing market, manifested most completely by the fact
that each house inhabits a distinct point in geographic space, the construction of any price index or
return series must draw on a wider set of houses. Before describing methods for constructing price
indices, it is helpful to define some basic notation. Specifically, let t index time periods, h index
the complete set of H houses in the area, j index the sample of J houses that sell multiple times
throughout the sample period, jpsq indicate a repeat sale of house j in period s. Let JS indicate the
sample that of transactions involving houses that sell multiple times. We will also use the notation
pjptq for the price of an individual transaction of house j at time t, pit to indicate the estimated
metropolitan price index at timet, and rt k,t to indicate the estimated return for the metropolitan
area between times t and t  k.
We now describe a procedure for constructing a distinct price index for each househ in the
full sample H - including those that never sell in the sample period. Let Xh characterize a set
of observable attributes of the house including, for example, precise location, square footage, year
built, and lot size. For each house j in the sample of houses that sell multiple times in the study
period, we construct a weight based on how similar it is to house h: whj  wpXh, Xjq. These can
be chosen in such a way to place strong weights on properties in close proximity in both geographic
and characteristic space (i.e., in real-estate parlance, comparable sales).
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To construct the price index for each house, we estimate a locally-weighted version of the repeat-
sales regression shown in 3.1 continuing to use all houses that sell multiple times but weighting
observations by whj .
lnppjpsqq  ξj   ωhs   εjpsq (3.3)
The estimated time dummies ωht are now a function of the exact weights used and form the
basis for the house-specific price index for house h. Notice that the only thing that changes in
constructing this price index for different houses in a metropolitan area is the weight on each house
j in the repeat sales sample. In practice, these weights will be essentially zero for a large fraction
of houses, those distant in either geographic or characteristic space. A price index and returns are
formed analogously to the methods above: piht  e
ωht and rt1,t 
piht1piht
piht
.
In our estimation procedure, every property exists through all time periods in the sample. In
actuality, however, many of the houses were built after the first time period; therefore, we are
estimating the value of a house before that house was actually built. At first it may appear that a
better approach would be to estimate a house price index only after the building year. However, in
this scenario, housing attributes are evolving over time and are likely driving the results of housing
returns. In comparison, in our approach all attributes stay constant throughout the sample. In this
way, we are able to measure returns to housing in Los Angeles, keeping the characteristics of housing
in the sample constant.
Taking house h as given, we then construct a weight between the given house and house j P J ,
denoted as whj and defined as
whj 
¹
cPC
fcpxcj , xchq
αc ,
¸
cPC
αc  1 (3.4)
where the subscript ch on f denotes the housing characteristic c for house h. We define Xj 
txcju c P C where xcj denotes the value of characteristic c for house j P J - such as the square footage
of the building. The functions fch are normal density functions with mean 0 and standard deviation
σ˜ch; therefore the density is greatest when houses h and j are identical in terms of characteristic c.
We use σ˜i,cto differentiate from the actual standard deviation of characteristic c between house h
and all houses in the sample j P J , which we instead denote as σhc.
We note our estimation depends on a two primary parameters: αc and σ˜ch. First, the relative
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importance of characteristic c in the total weighting is determined as αc; choosing αc  1 implies
that we value only a single characteristic in our weighting estimation. Secondly, our choice of σ˜ch
influences the relative weighting of house j based on characteristic c. For instance, if σ˜hc Ñ 0,
then fhcpq ¡ 0 for only the most similar houses and fhcpq  0 for all other homes. Alternatively
as σ˜hc Ñ 8, the distribution approaches a uniform distribution and all homes are given same fh,c
regardless of the similarity between houses. This would be equivalent to our simple repeated-sales
approach.
Simulation
To highlight the applicability of our approach against a standard repeat-sales index, we develop
a sample dataset and then conduct four separate estimations on the data. In our simulations we
assume that (i) a non-random subset of houses sell each time period and (ii) house are not identically
subject to the same aggregate shock. The purpose of the simulation is to then both highlight the
mismeasurements in a repeat-sales framework and to compare the results to the locally-weighted
repeat-sales technique.
In our simulated data, we assume there are two types of houses: (i) high-value and (ii) low-value.
All high-type houses share a random component each period, and similarly all low-type houses share
a random component each period. In addition, each house has a house-specific component and an
error term. Finally, we assume that low-tier housing sales more often than high-tier housing.
In the first estimation, we assume that the econometrician has perfect knowledge of the value of
a house every period - i.e. she has information on the appraisal value of every home each month.
This is our baseline simulation and serves as our best-case estimation. In the second, third, and
fourth estimations, we instead assume that we only know the value of a house when it is on the
market - this is generally the information set econometricians have when developing an aggregate
price index.
In the second estimation, we rely on a simple repeat-sales technique. The third estimation
applies the LWRS method assuming that the econometrician can perfectly identify a house by type.
In the fourth and final simulation we again conduct a LWRS technique, but instead assume that
econometricians do not have full information on the type of a given house.
We discuss the specifics of the simulation below. We use pijpsq to denote the price of house j at
time s and is part of group i P tHigh, Lowuwhere the price process follows
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pijpsq  ζj   ω
i
s   εjpsq (3.5)
We use ζj to denote a house-specific random component whereζ  iid Npµζ , σζq . Secondly,
ωis  iid Npµωσωq is a random variable specific to cohort i and period s and is iid across both time
and cohorts. Finallyεjpsq  iid Np0, σεq is a house and time-specific random variable that is again
iid across time and houses. For simplicity we assume that all random variable are standard normal
variables.
We assume that high and low-tier housing each comprise half of the housing market; however,
low-tier housing sells 75% of the time while low-tier housing sells only 25% of the time. Therefore,
low-tier housing will be over-represented in the market and will cause mismeasurement in traditional
house price indices.
Recall that the LWRS technique requires the econometrician to have information on the house-
type so that we can compare a particular house to similar houses that are on the market. Ideally,
the econometrician can identify every house by type; however, it may be possible that there is not
perfect information and the econometrician occasionally misidentifies a property. Therefore, in the
fourth estimation we assume that the econometrician misidentifies a house ten percent of the time.
We plot the results in Figure3.1. For ease of comprehension, we compare the absolute value of
each residual. In the first simulation, where the econometrician has full knowledge of all house prices
every period, the mean of the absolute value of the residual is 0.032 with a variance of 0.024. As
discussed this is our benchmark to compare all other estimates. In the second estimate, we conduct
the traditional repeat-sales; we have a mean of 0.26 and a variance of 0.20. Therefore, the mean is
820% larger than the first estimation, while the variance is 8.3 times larger.
In comparison, the LWRS with perfect information on house type has an average residual of 0.052
(163% larger) and residual variance 153% larger. Finally, the LWRS with imperfect information has
a mean of 0.11 (344% greater) and a variance that is 352% larger.
According to our results we find that the LWRS technique is vastly superior to the standard
repeat-sale method used by Case-Shiller. This holds true even when we assume that the econome-
trician can correctly identify all houses. Furthermore, the LWRS estimation with full information
has a similar residual to the best case scenario where we can see house prices for every house and
every period. Overall the simulation highlights the advantages of the LWRS method over current
techniques and suggests that our methods will offer a better evaluation of the housing market when
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we apply the strategy to the data.
Data
We next introduce and summarize the datasets used in our econometric analysis. Our data comes
from merging transaction-level data from Dataquick with loan-level data from the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act dataset. In addition, we rely on the Case-Shiller Tiered Price Indices for aggregate
results. According to our summary statistics we find that low tier housing in 2002-2006 experienced
the greatest price growth and the greatest turnover. We also argue that this effects appears linked
to the credit availability for low tier homebuyers.
Data Sources
Transaction Level Data We rely on a large database of housing transactions from Dataquick,
a for profit company that collects information on housing transactions to then sell to banks and
lenders. Each transaction includes the transaction price,property identification number, names of
the buyer and seller, location of the property, and house characteristics, including square footage and
year built. Dataquick creates this database from two sources; the first source is publicly available
data that covers every transaction in the US. This data includes all transaction variables, such as
buyer and seller name, price, and date. Secondly, housing characteristic variables are from the local
tax assessor's office, also a public source. Note that DataQuick has a single assessor file; therefore
we cannot take into account major housing improvements. This will affect our calculations of the
weighting values through our square footage attribute.
There are two primary advantages of the DataQuick dataset. First, all liens against the property
are recorded, so that one can observe second and third mortgages. As a result we can calculate
the total mortgage debt for each homeowner. Secondly, the name of both the buyer and seller are
recorded on the application. Using this data, we are able to identify the difference between a sale
and a foreclosure. A sale is identified if a second transaction on the property occurs in which the
buyer in the second transaction is identified as an individual. A foreclosure is identified if the buyer
on the second transaction is a bank or mortgage servicer.
We keep observations that are single land parcels, are arms length transactions, and where the
buyer and seller are different. We keep observations where the price, square feet, and coordinates
are non missing and nonzero. We drop observations where the year built is after 1880 and the
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transaction year is strictly greater than the year built. We drop duplicates observations with the
same price, property id, and transaction date; we also drop any property that sells on the same
date at multiple prices. We keep only observations that saw less than a 200% yearly appreciation
since the last transaction date. Finally, we drop any house that sells more than six times during the
sample, as well as all observations in the bottom 0.5% and top 0.5% of transaction price.
As we noted earlier, Dataquick has only a single assessor file, and as a result does not take into
account major housing improvements. To control for major improvements, we drop all observations
where the price increased more than 50% annually. Additionally, to attempt to control for suspected
improvements, we drop observations where the sum of loans is greater than the transaction price.
We summarize the Los Angeles Data below. After cleaning the data we are left with 549,564
houses sold more than once, and a total of 1,374,260 transactions. On average, our properties sold
2.5 times during our sample with some houses sold up to six times. The mean house was built
in 1965 and is 1,574 square feet in size. The mean price is $329,500 with an average yearly price
appreciation of 3.6%. All results are first measured on a quarterly basis and multiplied by four to
obtain yearly estimates.
To construct a distinct price index for each house, we must run a separate LWRS regression.
This is a computationally intensive procedure due both to the large number of observations in the
regression (nearly 1.4 million) and well as our reliance on orthogonal decomposition. Therefore,
instead of running the LWRS regression for all houses in sample, we randomly draw 5000 houses a
calculate a price index for each property.
We summarize the 5000 random properties below: importantly, the subsample looks quite similar
to the full sample. As before every house is sold at least twice and not more than six times with an
average of 2.5 times during 1988-2010. The average house is built in 1965 and is nearly 1,600 square
feet in size. The mean transaction price during the sample is $333,867 with a minimum of $19,772
and maximum of $1,975,000. Finally, yearly appreciation is 3.6%.
While our paper focuses on the Los Angeles market, we redo our analysis for several additional
metropolitan areas: (i) San Francisco, (ii) Miami, (iii) Cleveland, (iv) Chicago, and (v) Denver. We
choose these geographic regions largely due to data availability, especially during the earlier years
of our sample. Importantly for our robustness check, these cities exhibit heterogeneous returns
patterns over the time sample. Nominal house prices in San Francisco grew nearly 220% between
1997 and 2006, resulting in one of the largest booms in the country. Values began to fall in 2007,
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dropping forty percent by 2010. Miami also experienced a housing boom, though substantial growth
did not start until 2001. Then prices increased 130% in less than six years before plummeting back
to 2003 values. Real estate values have only begun to rebound in 2012. In comparison, Chicago saw
a significantly smaller boom, growing eighty percent between 2000 and 2006. However, we do see
a large bust as prices fell nearly 35% until recovering in 2012. Cleveland essentially no real estate
boom: 2000-2006 real estate prices grew only twenty-five percent, or less than four percent a year.
Similar to other cities in the rust belt, there was a housing bust as prices have declined from peak.
Finally, as a control we include the Denver metropolitan region. Between 2002 and 2006 Denver real
estate prices increased only fifteen percent before declining back to 2002 nominal values in 2009.
The city saw essentially no housing boom and only a minimal bust.
Household Credit Data Our Household Credit Data comes the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
Data, a publicly available database of loan applications. We merge this data with the DataQuick
dataset using the matching variables: loan amount, lender name, date of transaction, and the
geographic location of the property. Using this data we have detailed information on the debt level
and income of the homebuyer, as well as the interest rate on the loan.
Aggregate House Price Data Our first data source comes from aggregated data from the Case-
Shiller Metropolitan Tiered Indices. These Indices develop a separate price index for the highest,
medium, and lowest valued houses in the metropolitan area. These tiers are estimated by separating
all transactions each month into one of three bins based on transaction price and then estimating
each index separately. For example, in December 2011, the three tiers in Los Angeles are defined
as: under $289,982, $298,982-$474,017, and over $4740,17. We offer results for sixteen different
metropolitan statistical areas.
Data Summary
With our data sources we can now develop evidence that: (i) housing price growth varies substantially
even within metropolitan areas, (ii) the composition of houses changes over the business cycle, and
(iii) both effects may be the result of changing credit conditions. In particular we focus on the
comparative growth between low and high tier housing within MSAs. We argue that low tier
housing sold more often and experienced faster house price growth between 2002-2006 than high
tier housing, and then tie this result to credit supply that predominantly affected the less valuable
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houses in the distribution.
First, the literature has long recognized the level of price dispersion between geographic regions.
To deal with this heterogeneity, price indices have been developed for individual US states and
metropolitan areas. Consider the price patterns of US cities between 2000 and 2014. Between 2002
and 2006 areas in California, Arizona, Nevada, and Florida experienced annual returns of over twenty
percent; these same locations saw similar magnitude drops during 2007-2010. In comparison, other
areas, even large metropolitan areas, experienced little 2002-2006 growth and similarly little price
loss between 2007-2010.
Perhaps less recognized, however, is the dispersion within metropolitan areas. We illustrate this
simple point by plotting the Low and High Tiers from the Case-Shiller Tiered Indices for 2000-2014.
Of the sixteen US MSAs, we find the greatest dispersion in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami,
Washington D.C., and San Diego, respectively. For instance we find that between 2000 and 2006
the top third of Los Angeles market grew 130%; compare this to the bottom third of the market
that saw a combined growth of 230% during the same period. The effect is most pronounced during
the 2004-2006 years when low tier housing grew over twice the rate of high value housing in all five
MSAs.
Secondly, we next offer evidence that during 2004-2006, the houses that sold most often were the
same houses that saw the greatest price growth. We plot the relative market share of low and high
value housing between 1998 and 2008 for the Los Angeles market. We break housing into quartiles:
in 1998 both low and high value housing each composed twenty-five percent of all market share
transactions. These values then began to diverge. By 2004-2005 low income housing composed
nearly 35% of all transactions, while high income housing made up only fifteen percent. These
trends then reversed so that by the end of 2006, low and high value properties composed twenty and
twenty-eight percent of all transactions, respectively. It is not surprising that this significant change
could affect the composition of home sales and as a result house price indices.
We next to determine that this effect is not simply unique to the Los Angeles market. For instance
low tier housing composed only twenty percent of all housing transactions in the San Francisco market
before becoming nearly forty of the market at the end of the 2004. These transactions then declined
dramatically by 2007 and made up only seventeen percent of all housing turnover. Miami reflects a
similar, though weaker, story. Low Tier housing grew from twenty percent of the market to thirty
percent, before declining back to fifteen percent in 2007. In comparison, Denver - a metropolitan
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area that saw little housing boom or bust - shows no clear result. Both low and high tier housing
compose roughly one quarter of all housing transactions during the entire 2002-2008 time period.
Our results highlight a strong correlation between house prices and housing turnover. While
we are the first to document this result at the intra-city level, previous research has established
a similar effect at the inter-city or national level. Stein (1995) finds that a 10% drop in prices is
associated with a 1.5 million unit reduction in the number of transactions or about a 38% decline
in annual transactions. Other papers have found a similar relationship in the United Kingdom
(Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2004). There are a number of potential explanations for this result. For
instance, homeowners may depend on returns to the current house to pay the down payment for
a new home (Stein 1995, Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2006), search and matching frictions (Wheaton
1990, Ngai and Tenreyro 2010) or behavioral explanations such as the Disposition Effect (Genesove
and Mayer 2001). We choose to remain agnostic on the underlying cause of this result, and instead
focus on the econometrics consequences of this correlation. In addition, we note that our results do
not depend on a positive correlation between turnover and price. Our results generalize to any case
in which a subset of assets have a different price process and sell more frequently (for instance a
negative correlation would have a similar result).
The underlying question then is what drove the demand for low value housing between 2002 and
2006, and why did this demand suddenly reverse4? A key advantage of working with disaggregated
portfolios of houses is that it is the possible to link housing price dynamics to underlying changes in
the economic and policy environment. While a complete understanding of the relationship between
the mortgage and housing markets would require an approach that recognizes their interconnected-
ness, it is easy to see in the data that the collapse of low tier housing prices is closely linked to the
collapse of the availability of credit for buyers of these properties.
We compare low and high tier housing in the Los Angeles MSA along four financial characteristics:
(i) Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio, (ii) Debt-to-Income Ration, (iii) Real Income Growth, and (iv)
Foreclosure Rate. For homes in the top quartile, the loan-to-value ratio stayed constant between
2002 and 2006. Then we find a decline of about five percentage point between 2006 and 2008. In
comparison, for firms in the bottom quartile, the loan-to-value ratio increased from 90% in 2000 to
4A large literature has attempted to understand the drivers of house price growth including neighborhood spillover
(Bayer et al 2007, Autor et al 2012), productivity growth (Van Nieuwerburgh and Olivier-Weill 2009), or Geographic
Elasticity (Saiz 2010). Here, we simply document one possible explanation: financial opportunities.
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nearly 94% in 2006; however in the collapse of the credit markets, we find that to LTV ratio declined
a eight percent. Therefore, the rise and fall of the Combined Loan-to-Value Ratio is greater for
low tier houses. Next, the Debt-to-Income Ratio appears relatively uniform between high and low
tier housing. The Ratio for low tier housing (high tier housing) rises from fifteen percent (sixteen
percent) in 2003 to twenty-three percent in 2006 before declining to nineteen percent. Similarly, real
income growth is comparable across low and high tier housing. Low tier housing had two percent
real income growth in 2001, eleven percent in 2006 and negative fifteen percent by 2008. The high
tier housing results are similar.
The greatest difference between low and high tier properties is evidenced in foreclosure rates.
The Foreclosure rate for high tier housing stays at roughly two percent between 2001 and 2003 before
slowly rising to ten percent by 2006. In contrast, the foreclosure rate for low tier housing starts at
ten percent in 2001, declines to only one percent in 2006 and then falls to a stunning thirty-five
percent in 2008. Of course, these results only suggest a correlation between financial conditions
and intra-city house price growth; however, the results warrant future research for a more complete
understanding.
Results
We are now ready to apply the locally weighted repeat sales (LWRS) technique to transaction-level
data on the US housing market. The first step is to construct the weighting matrix for the subset of
properties and then estimate the individual price index. The second step is aggregate the results to
develop a price index for any subset of the population. We compare our results to the Case-Shiller
results for a number of cities around the US. Additionally, to illustrate the advantage of our method,
we apply our estimation to create price indices for houses sorted by (i) location and (ii) past returns.
Technical Results
Before our estimation, we must first detail the implementation of the LWRS technique to the housing
market. As discussed before our analysis relies on comparing a given house h to all houses in the
sample j P J in order to construct the weight ωhj . For simplicity we choose three housing attributes
to calculate the weight between house i and j : the age of the building, xaj , square footage, xaj , and
the location (or distance), xdj . Distance between houses i and j is calculated using our longitude
and latitude data. We can then calculate the weight ωhj as
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ωhj  fdhpxdjq
α  fshpxsjq
β  fh,Apxajq
1αβ (3.6)
For our estimation we calibrate α  0.5, and β  0.3, therefore we weight the distance between
houses most heavily, followed by the size of the house, and then by the age of the building. Ad-
ditionally, recall that fch are normal density functions with mean xch and standard deviation σ˜ch;
we now need to calibrate σ˜ch for the estimation. One obvious possibility is to simply define σ˜ch as
the actual standard deviation of characteristicc between house h and all houses in the sample j P J
(which we denote as: σh,c). However, this places too equal a weighting on all houses. Instead we
augment the standard deviation as follows: σ˜dh  0.1  σdh, σ˜sh  0.1  σsh, σ˜ah  0.1  σah.
Equation 3.3 is estimated separately on the repeat sales sample using the weights associated with
house h. The resulting parameter estimates provide an estimate of quarterly returns for house h
over the sample period and can also be used to construct an estimate of the market value of house
h at each point in time. Given the estimates of the return series, we back out the implied house
fixed effect for each house that sells at least once and use this with the return series to construct the
estimated price of each house at each point in time. We rely only on houses that sell at least once
during the sample. For a house that never sells during the sample period, a hedonic approach will
be needed to estimate the houses value at a particular point in time.
According to the Case Shiller LA Price Index, properties experienced a yearly mean price appreci-
ation of about 4.9% with a standard deviation of 14.8%. This period, however, saw both substantial
price raises and subsequent drops. In particular, yearly appreciation was estimated to be as high as
40.54% in the second quarter of 2004 and dropped as low a -42.4% in the first quarter of 2008. The
result is that prices grew over 260% between 1997 and 2006 and 220% in the four years between
2000-2006. Then values declined just as fast, dropping forty percent between 2007 and the end of
20095.
We first compare our return distribution to the estimates under the repeat-sales OLS regression.
We estimate the mean individual house in our sample saw a mean quarterly return of 0.62% with
a standard deviation of 7.4%. In comparison, in our OLS results we estimate the mean return to
5To calculate yearly price appreciation, we first calculate quarterly price appreciation and multiply the results by
four. By relying on quarterly estimates, we can compare the Case-Shiller results to the results from our estimation
technique.
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be slightly lower at 0.22% with a standard deviation of 4.7%. The greatest house price gain in our
sample occurred in 2004 with a return of 11%. Losses were greatest during the 4th quarter of 2007
and the 1st quarter of 2008 at 11%.The cross-sectional return standard deviation is measured to be
2.7% through our time sample. The standard deviation is greatest in 2008 at a value of 5.0% and a
low in 2004 with a value of 1.2%.
Serial correlation in returns has been documented in a number of asset classes, including equities,
bonds, currencies, commodities, and real assets (Cutler et al. 1991). However, the effect appears to
particularly significant and long-lasting in housing markets where price changes are serially correlated
for 8 to 14 quarters (Cho 1996) and (Guren 2013). Various papers have proposed a number of
potential explanations for this effect, ranging from investor learning (Annenberg 2013), sentiment-
driven house price moments (Burnside et al. 2013), behavioral biases (Barberis et al., 1998, Hong
and Stein, 1999), and search frictions (Head et al. 2012).We contribute to this literature by offering
new evidence that this same effect holds even at the individual house property level and therefore
is not the result of aggregation bias.
We offer two new pieces of evidence of a momentum effect: (i) returns are highly autocorrelated,
and (ii) returns are highly predictable at the one year level. First returns are highly correlated with
prior returns over the eight previous quarters. The correlation is greatest at the one-year mark: the
current quarter returns are correlated at a high 44% with returns from four quarters prior. Positive
autocorrelation dies out after the 10th quarter, and we see strong reversal at the end of the fourth
year. Specifically,y, autocorrelation is -30% at the end of four years. Our autocorrelation results
suggest high momentum at the one-year level. Therefore, we now test the degree that past year
returns predict future returns over the next four quarters. In our baseline estimate we find that a
10% increase in returns predicts a 6.7% return. The simple regression results has a relatively high
-R2 of 0.29.
Returning to our predictability estimations, we find that our results are not unique simply for
Los Angeles but hold in all four additional metropolitan areas. The effect is strongest in Miami and
Chicago (a 10% return predicts over a 9% return the following year). San Francisco experiences a
similar effect with Los Angeles at 5%, while Cleveland observes a substantially smaller estimate at
2%. In all cases the effect is highly statistically significant.
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Mismeasurement Results
Simply by summing the individual indices we can properly construct returns for any of a number of
more aggregate portfolios; aggregating over all the houses in the metropolitan area (including those
that do not sell) gives rise to a metropolitan price index that properly accounts for the heterogeneity
in the subset of houses that sells at each point in time. Using the locally weighted repeat sales
method we can fully estimate reveal the bias in traditional price indices.
Beginning in 2004 the Los Angeles Case-Shiller type index substantially overstates the peak of
the housing bubble by roughly 20%. As discussed before, this is due to the fact that same homes
that experienced significant price growth also began to sell the most frequently. Not surprisingly
then, the estimated metropolitan price indices are remarkably similar between 1988 and 2004 when
there is little evidence of any systematic heterogeneity in returns in the metropolitan area.
To further establish our argument we attempt to replicate the Case-Shiller Tiered Index using
our LWRS technique. Beginning in July 1989, houses are ranked on the basis of their estimated
mean value over the previous year and divided into three tiers. Each tier characterized a third of
the aggregate market. Averaging the estimated returns for house each quartile over the next time
period provides an estimates of the returns for that portfolio over that period. Moving forward to
the next year, portfolios are re-balanced (i.e., houses are divided into three tiers again) on the basis
of estimated market value in July 1990 and the procedure is repeated through the first quarter of
2010. We find that the results presented below are nearly identical whether we rebalance portfolios
every quarter or every year.
We find that the Case-Shiller Low Tier Index overstates the 2004-2006 bubble by over thirty
percent. However, prior to 2004 the LWRS result closely tracks the Case-Shiller estimation. In
comparison at the peak of the housing bubble, Case-Shiller measure and the LWRS 2004-2006 price
growth differs by less than two percent; we find a similar effect for the Middle Tier of the market.
The results appear to suggest that the discrepancy is entirely due to the Low Tier Housing Market
- exactly the same homes that saw the greatest turnover. Specifically, certain housing in the low
tier subgroup simultaneously experienced high growth and high turnover. In comparison, we find
no evidence of this effect in the rest of the market.
For robustness purposes, we complete the analysis for several additional US metropolitan cites.
First, Case-Shiller appears to overstate Miami house price growth beginning around 2002 and this
result escalates in 2005. Specifically, traditional repeat-sales overestimate the housing boom by
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roughly twenty percent. Interestingly, Case-Shiller also overstates the price decline: we calculate
house prices to be fifteen percent above historical estimates.
In comparison, Case-Shiller does a reasonable job of matching the San Francisco housing boom,
but does not accurately reflect the true housing bust. According to Case-Shiller, house prices declined
over thirty percent between 2006 and the end of 2008. We instead find no evidence of a San Francisco
housing bust. Instead, the LWRS technique estimates that between 2006 and 2008 prices barely
moved and if anything slightly increased.
Next, consider the case of Cleveland: the two price indices match precisely between 2000 and
2006; however, Case-Shiller actually underestimates the true decline in prices. The Case-Shiller
estimate finds that nominal prices declined only slightly between 2006 and 2008, while the LWRS
technique finds that prices actually declined approximately fifty percent in only three years.
Finally, recall that Denver (i) only a minor housing boom and bust and (ii) low tier housing did
not experience again turnover growth: as a result, we should expect that the LWRS closely mirrors
the Case-Shiller estimation. We find this is exactly the case, and that the distinction between the
indices in 2006 is less than one percent.
Overall these result highlight the practicality of the Locally-Weighted Repeat Sales Technique.
Despite the simplicity of the estimation, it allows us to control for both changes in housing turnover
and intra-city price growth in a way not previously possible. We hope future researcher and practi-
tioners apply our methods to better our understanding of the housing markets.
Application Results
In addition to providing unbiased metropolitan-level price indices, the LWRS technique offers an
opportunity to properly construct returns for any of a number of aggregate portfolios. In essence,
we now have exactly the kind of data available to empirical asset pricing researchers in equities,
bonds, and derivatives. These heterogeneous returns series can then provide a straightforward tool
for characterizing aspects of housing price dynamics that the literature has not yet explored for
example: (i) the extent of variation in returns within metropolitan housing markets at various
points in the business cycle, (ii) heterogeneity in returns across different classes of assets over the
business cycle, (iii) linking local productivity shocks to returns in different segments of the market,
and (iv) covariation in returns across classes of assets both within and across metropolitan markets.
We now highlight the applicability of the LWRS technique by developing alternative price indices.
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First, price indices can also be constructed for particular types of properties (based on observable
characteristics) and for particular locations within the metropolitan area; here we focus on the
effects of location. Secondly, we can sort houses based on estimated value or returns in previous
time periods to develop understand the benefits of momentum and reversal trading strategies.
Sorting on Location To illustrate the application of our analysis, we characterize houses
by the relative distance from the city center. There are two early papers that specifically look at
differences in house price appreciation rates between low and high end properties. Case and Mayer
(1996) look at differential movements in prices within cities of the Boston metro area between 1982
and 1992; they find houses 15.4 miles from Boston grew 5.1% faster than houses 31.5 miles from
Boston in a sample from 1982 to 1994. Similarly, Case and Marynchenko (2002) look at differential
trends in prices across different zip codes within the Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles metro areas
during the 1983 to 1993 period. More recent papers have attempted to empirically explain the cross-
sectional dispersion in housing price between metropolitan areas. For instance Bayer et al. (2007)
and Ross-Hansberg et al. (2010) explain cross-section housing within a city with a neighborhood
consumption externality, while Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst (2011) explain house price movements
across neighborhoods within a city to the positive neighborhood externality that individuals like to
live next to richer neighbors.
To confirm these studies we consider the effects of population density from the Los Angeles area
by sorting each property based on distance from the highest density population neighborhoods. We
define neighborhoods using the US Census Bureau's boundaries of 88 cities and 43 census-designated
places. We find the Koreatown neighborhood to be the most densely populated neighborhood
in the city, with 42,611 people per square mile, followed by Westlake and East Hollywood, with
densities of 38,214 and 31,095 population per square mile, respectively. Both Westlake and East
Hollywood border Koreatown; therefore, we believe it is reasonable to use the geographic coordinates
of Koreatown as the population center of the Los Angeles area.
Intuitively, we should expect that subject to a city-wide demand shock, locations with an inelastic
housing supply will experience the largest growth in real estate price. All else equal, high density
neighborhoods will have little available land to build new housing and so are comparatively less
elastic.
As expected we find that highly dense areas experienced the largest price growth during high
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demand periods. We consider the 2002-2006 years as a period of a persistent positive national
demand shock due to the growth in first time home buyers, high credit supply, and low interest
rates. We find that during these years properties closest to Koreatown-specifically the 10% closest
among our subsample - saw price growth of nearly 175% between 1996 and 2006, or 17.5% annually.
In comparison, houses furthest from Koreatown grew about 12% annually during this same period.
The price effects from high density neighborhoods is closely in line with previous estimates.
Sorting on Past Returns Secondly, we offer new evidence that momentum portfolios outper-
form the market. At each point in time, it is straightforward to bin houses based on their estimated
return the previous period. In this way, one can rebalance value-based portfolios at each point in
time and construct price (and return) series for these portfolios in a way that is exactly analogous
to time-varying portfolios. For our purpose we update portfolios once a year to control for noise in
the estimation process, and compare returns over the following year.
We find positive short-run momentum within the LA local metropolitan area. As discussed
before, mean returns are estimated to be 4.5% for all properties in our sample, while median returns
are similar. Houses at the 90th percentile of returns last year instead experience 9.4% price growth
the following year. In comparison houses that had the least growth (bottom decile) see negative
returns the following year at the level of 0.4%.
Again, as a robustness check we redo our analysis for the four additional metropolitan areas
and again find the qualitative results hold. In San Francisco, a house in the 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentile of returns experienced future annual returns of 2%, 6%, and 9% annually. The effects
are similar in both Miami and Chicago. Cleveland has experienced significantly lower price returns
during our time period (the median is -1%); however, housing in the top 10% of returns actually
experienced 7% returns the following year.
Conclusion
Due to its illiquid and unique nature, housing, along with other assets, is difficult to price individually.
As a result it has been historically quite difficult to examine the fundamental drivers of housing at
the property level. This paper makes two primary contributions to the literature: (i) develop an
econometric strategy to value an individual house, and (ii) evaluate the bias underlying standard
price indices.
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In our empirical analysis we develop the locally-weight repeat-sales index. We take any given
house and then weight all nearby houses by numerous physical characteristics. Then we run a
repeat-sale index, but weight each house according to similarities with all houses in the market. The
result develops an individual price index for any given house. We then apply our estimation to test
if standard price indices are mismeasured due to fluctuations in market composition. We find that
beginning in 2004 traditional house price indices overestimate the Los Angeles boom by 20%, and
that the effect is entirely driven by high turnover and house price growth in the low tier housing
market.
The goal of future work is to extend our current analysis to isolate the causes of house return
predictability. Theoretic papers such as Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2002), Barberis, Huang, and
Thaler (2003), and Grinblatt and Han (2005) suggest that prospect theory and mental accounting
help explain the cross-section of stock market returns. A companion paper attempts to better
understand the particular role of disposition in real estate price shocks, specifically the tendency of
home owners to sale only after a price gain. A positive demand shock results in an increase of houses
on the market, causing price depression in the short-term. The cumulative effect is predictability
in the market. Empirical research has found that stock prices drift after news announcements.
Specifically, not only does good news causes price appreciation, but price continue to drift upwards
after receiving good news. The purpose of future work is then to document a similar effect in the
housing market.
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4 Do Real Estate Prices Impact Entrepreneurial Financing?
Evidence from the Home Equity Channel
Introduction
Between 1997 and 2009 the Debt-to-GDP ratio of US noncorporate firms (i.e sole proprietorships and
limited partnerships) grew faster than both household debt and corporate debt before subsequently
declining by 14% during the Financial Crisis. Both the media and fellow financial researchers have
highlighted the possibility that this rise and fall of small business financing is linked to house price
growth and could result in macroeconomic consequences:
We show that during the house price boom of 2002-2007, areas with rising house prices
(and increased leverage) experienced a significantly bigger increase in small business
starts....the collateral channel can account for 10-25% of the increase in pre-crisis em-
ployment. -Adelino, Schoar, and Seveino, 2013
It is well known that the housing bust has taken a devastating toll on American families,
nearly three million of which have lost their homes to foreclosure. Less known is the
impact that the housing collapse is having on owners of small businesses, which have often
relied upon home-equity borrowing to finance the early stages of growth and development.-
Wall Street Journal, February 1st, 2012
The underlying mechanism implicit in both articles is the role of home equity as a source of initial
financing for small firms; to date, however, we have little understanding of the economic significance
of home equity financing, or the effects of house price growth on financing opportunities. As a
result, any heterogeneous impacts of house prices could be the result of unobservable differences
between small and large firms within a region. For instance, if small firms are more at risk of
local demand shocks, then price shocks should have a larger relative impact on small firms within a
region. Distinguishing between these two stories requires detailed data on entreprenuerial financing
decisions.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is empirically validate the interpretation that house price
shocks on entrepreneurs are indeed collateral shocks. Using a new firm-level dataset on US small
firms, we offer explicit evidence that (i) home equity is an economically significant source of financing,
and (ii) house price shocks impact initial firm financing decisions.
First, during 2006 eleven percent of all start-ups relied on home equity to initially fund the firm.
This number increases up to 29% of firms with financing needs between $100,000 and $249,999. We
find that home equity financing is predicted when (i) the owner has a significant role in the firm or
the firm in the principle source of income, (ii) the owner is middle-aged, specifically 35-54 years of
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age, or (iii) the firm is in the accomdation and food services sector.
We next highlight the role of house price shocks in small firm financing. To isolate this effect we
distinguish between firms that take under $5,000 in initial financing and firms that at least $5,000.
This allows us to separate local demand shocks-which affect all firms- from collateral shocks that
affect only firms with large financing needs.
There are two sources of endogeneity in our analysis. First, firms with large financing needs may
be uniquely affected by local demand shocks. Secondly, initial financing needs are an endogenous
choice. To overcome the first concern we follow the literature by instrumenting for exogenous
house price growth from the housing supply elasticity measure first developed by Saiz (2010). As
discussed in Cvijanovic (2013) the intuition for this approach local areas with little undeveloped
land experience large real estate price appreciation in response to an increase in the aggregate real
estate demand while areas with available undeveloped land will experience more minor price growth
since the demand can be easily supplied. Our strategy to alleviate the second issue-financing is an
endogenous choice- we allow for both firm and owner characteristics in the empirical specification.
We estimate that a 10% real estate price growth increases home equity financing by 1.1% for the
mean firm and the probability that a firm financing exclusively by 0.4%. The results hold when we
alternatively develop a psuedo-panel estimation estimation.
The effects of real estate shocks are strongest for large start-ups. A 10% real estate growth
increases home equity financing by 2.1% for firms with been $250,000 and $1 million in initial
financing.
In response to an exogenous shock to real estate price growth, start-ups increase reliance on
home equity financing, causing a decline in financing through formal bank loans. Specifically, a 10%
increase in real estate prices causes a 1.7% decrease in the probability of bank lending. Other forms
of financing appear unaffected, suggesting home equity does not take the place of informal channels
such as family loans, savings, or credit cards.
As discussed above we are not the first to identify the role of credit constraints in entrepreneur-
ship. First a number of papers have theoretically documented the role of credit constraints in the
entrepreneurship decision, including Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
This theory appears to hold up empirically: one line of the literature has focused on using house
price growth as a credit shock on small business. For instance Hurst and Lusardi (2004) document
that prices impact the decision to start a business, but only at the top of the wealth distribution.
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More recent evidence from Schmalz, Sraer, and Thesmar (2014) suggests instead that house price
significantly impact all firms. We contribute to this literature by validating those application of
house price growth to understand credit constraints.
Secondly, recent research has found evidence that house price growth on entreprenuers can have
implications on macroeconomic employment. For instance, Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2013)
validate that small firm employment in a county is disproportionately affected by house price shocks
and they interpret this as evidence of a collateral effect from small firms borrowing against home
equity. Missing from this research, however, is evidence of the size and scope of home equity financing
among entreprenuers.
More generally, the role of real estate price shocks on the financial sector have been explored in
a number of alternative, but related settings. For instance, Mian and Sufi (2011, 2013) argue that
strong correlation between house prices and (i) local debt or (ii) local consumption expenditures is
evidence of households borrowing against home equity. Meanwhile, a separate literature considers
the effect of local commercial real estate shocks on corporate debt (Cvijanovic 2014), corporate
investment (Chaney et al. 2012), or small firm employment (Kleiner 2013). Our research sheds
lights on these papers by offering direct evidence that the correlation between price shocks and
economic outcomes can be attributed to a credit channel.
The outline for this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our empirical methodology and
summarizes the data. Section 3 discusses the results and Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Methodology and Data
The purpose of our paper is to first determine the role of home equity in small firm financing, and
secondly, to evaluate the effect of house price shocks on financing availability. In this section, we
determine the empirical specification necessary to achieve the latter goal, and then summarize the
data to fulfill the former.
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Empirical Methodology
To directly test how real estate price growth affects small firm financing through home equity we
run the following linear probability model:
HomeEquityi  β  ∆%P
l  1rFin ¡ $5, 000s   κ ∆%P l
 ξ  ∆%Unempl   ζ  ∆%GDP l   α  controlsit   εit
(4.1)
∆%P l20022006  α  χ Elasticity
l   ult (4.2)
where HomeEquity is a binary choice variable: a value of 1 means the business relied on home
equity to finance the start-up of the business. Next ∆%P lt is the state-level residential house price
increases between 2002 and 2006.
To identify the effects of a collateral affect separate from a demand shock, we separate between
real estate shocks that affect all firms and any additional shock that only affects firms with at least
$5,000 in initial financing. Therefore β is our key coefficient of interest and measures the effect of
real estate growth on home equity financing.
Since real estate prices are likely correlated with investment opportunities due to the omitted
variable of local demand shocks we control for investment opportunities using housing supply elas-
ticity as an instrument for exogenous real estate price growth. To achieve this we develop a new
measure of state-wide house supply elasticity as the population-weighted measure of MSA local
housing supply elasticity. In addition we include measures of state demand shocks, specifically GDP
growth ∆%GDP and the unemployment rate ∆%Unemp.
In addition we include a number of standard controls in our analysis; this allows us control for any
differences between small and large financing firms. The controls include both firm characteristics
(such as NAICS sector fixed effects and firm size fixed effects) and owner characteristics (such as
number of owner, and educational background).
In our first stage results we find that our state-level measure of housing supply elasticity is highly
correlated with real estate values between 2002 and 2006. A coefficient of -0.25 implies that a one
standard deviation increase in elasticity decreases real estate price growth by 8 percentage points.
This reflects that even at the state-level housing supply elasticity was a strong predictor of the
run-up of housing price growth documented between 2002 and 2006.
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One concern with this analysis is that we are not able to control for unobservable firm character-
istics as we only have cross-sectional data. However, due to our large sample we can also develop a
psuedo-panel of our data by characterizing a pseudo-firm with a specific state and level of financing
needs
{HomeEquityit  β  P l  1rFin ¡ $5, 000s   κ P lt
 ξ  Unemplt   ζ GDP
l
t   αi   δt   ψl  
{controlsit   εit (4.3)
P lt  β
P pElasticityl  Itq   φt   θl   αi   εit (4.4)
In this specification, {HomeEquity is now the probability that pseudo-firm i financed through
home equity in year t . In addition αi is a pseudo-firm fixed effect, δt is a year effect, ψl is a location
fixed effect, and P lt is the housing price index for location l. We develop controls for our pseudo-firm,{controls, which as before control for changes in both firm and owner characteristics.
As before, our analysis relies on an exogenous source of real estate price growth; therefore we also
derive a time-varying instrument by interacting the conventional mortgage rate with the state-level
housing supply elasticity. The intuition in this specification is that the national mortgage rate is a
measure of national house demand. Local demand shocks will most impact house price growth in
inelastic regions during periods of high national demand- and therefore low mortgage rates. The
specification is similar to Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012).
Data Summary
Accounting Data
Survey of Small Business Owners Our empirical analysis depends on a new firm-level
dataset from the Survey of Business Owners (SBO) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). The
SBO PUMS is a cross-sectional dataset on entrepreneurs and surveys a random sample of business
from a complete list of all firms operating during 2007 with receipts of $1,000 or more compiled
by the IRS. Useful for our purposes the SBO PUMS includes firm data such as external financing
sources, location, employment, and revenues, as well as detailed information on business owners.
We use the data between 2002 and 2007 for our results.
We first note the magnitude of our sample at 949,169 firms according to Table 31. Employment
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is the mean number of employees per firm, while all remaining variables are the percentage of firms
that rely on the specified external financing option.
In our summary statistics we distinguish cohorts by the level of initial received financing: (i)
less than $5,000, (ii) $5,000-9,999, (iii) $10,000-24,999, (iv) $25,000-49,999, (v) $50,000-99,999, (vi)
$100,000-249,999, (vii) $250,000-999,999, and (viii) greater than $1 million. In addition note that we
have nearly 40,000 firms with financing needs of at least one million dollars on creation. Therefore
our sample covers a wide range of start-ups during the 2002-2007 period.
To give some indication we use survey weights to determine the actual proportion in the econ-
omy: (i) less than $5,000 make up 51% of firms (ii) $5,000-9,999 compose 12%, (iii) $10,000-24,999
represent 12%, (iv) $25,000-49,999 are 8% of the economy, (v) $50,000-99,999 are 7%, (vi) $100,000-
249,999 are 6%, (vii) $250,000-999,999 compose 4% of all firms, and (viii) greater than $1 million
represent 1% of initial businesses. Therefore, the larger firms are actually overrepresented in our
survey compared to the true population.
The mean firm has 5.1 employees and over half of the firms in our sample are nonemployer firms.
Employment in the first cohort (financing under $5,000) is only 3.2 and increases monotonically to
34.5 employees in the largest cohort (financing at least $1 million).
We find strong evidence that larger firms are more likely to rely on more formal sources of
financing. For instance 81 percent of all firms in the sample rely on some sort of savings: this
value is largest for the smallest cohort (88%) and declines with firm financing needs to 57%. In
comparison, 12% of firms take a business loan and this value is largely driven by the largest firms.
While only 1% of the smallest firms require a formal business loan, 47% of firms with at least one
million dollars in initial funding take a loan.
In line with Robinson and Robb (2012) we find little evidence of family loans even among the
smallest firms: 4% of our firms rely on family loans in any way. If anything, family loans actually
increse with the size of the firm: only 1% of firms in our smallest cohort recieve family loans, yet
among firms with at least $250,000 in initial financing, the level increases to eight percent. Instead
of family loans, small firms in our sample tend to depend on savings and credit cards. About
one-quarter of firms with $5,000-$100,000 use credit cards in their initial financing.
Following Robinson and Robb (2012) we interpret these magnitudes as an indication of relative
important to develop a pecking order. In this case owner equity is the more preferable followed by
formal debt channels. For smaller firms the debt channels are through credit cards, while larger
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firms instead use bank loans and home equity loans. Informal debt channels and outside equity are
less preferred, but do become more commong with larger firms.
We also consider the source of later funding as according to our data over half of all firms in our
sample require expansion capital at some point after the establishment first opens. The percentages
are similar to our results on initial financing with two exceptions. First, entreprenuers are now
able to finance firm expansions through profits and sixteen percent choose to follow this strategy.
Secondly, credit cards are more common among subsequent financing at a level of 30% compared to
20%.
Real Estate Data
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight House Price Index The OFHEO House
Price Index is available at the state level starting in 1975 and for the majority of Metropolitan
Statistical Areas starting in 1987. For our purposes we focus on the state level data between 2002
and 2007. During this time period we find significant cross-sectional heterogeneity in real estate
price growth. Specifically, Michigan saw 10% and Indiana and Ohio saw an 11% increase in house
price between 2002 and 2006. In comparison Hawaii, Florida, Nevada and California saw a combined
growth rate of 93%, 88%, 87%, and 86%, respectively.
Local Housing Supply Elasticity The local housing supply elasticity measure comes from
Saiz (2010) and is available for 95 MSAs. It is estimated using processing satellite-generated data
on elevation and presence of bodies of water. Given our focus on state-level data, we develop a new
measure of state housing supply elasticity: specifically, we weight each MSA as a fraction of the
population of the state. From our state-level estimates we find a large range from an elasticity from
0.65 for New Hampshire, 0.69 for New Jersey and New York to 2.83 for Nebraska and Iowa and 3.36
for Kansas.
Regional Data
Bureau of Economic Analysis State GDP Due control for time-varying changes within
a state, we also include data on both GDP and unemployment. Our GDP data comes from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. We find that between 2002 and 2006 the median state saw an 11%
increase in real GDP with the 10th and 90th percentiles at 5% and 21%.
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Bureau of Labor Statistics Unemployment Rate The state-level unemployment rate is
the Bureau of Labor statistics. The unemployment rate fell about 1% in the average state with no
change at the 90th percentile.
Results
Our empirical specification, taken with the data sources discussed above, provides a simple model
to determine that home equity financing is driven by real estate price growth. We now discuss our
results and offering significant evidence that the a house price shock on entrepreneurs can indeed
be characterized as a collateral shock. Secondly, we determine the effects are greatest for firms
that receive greater initial financing. Third, in response to a price shock, entrepreneurs rely less on
alternative sources of financing, namely bank loans, family loans, and owner assets.
Who Borrows from Home Equity? We first attempt to determine the size and scope of home
equity loans in entreprenuerial financing and find that 11% of all firms fund their small firm with
home equity. The value increases to 29% for firms with financing needs of $100,000-249,999 before
declining for the very largest firms. Additionally, home equity has increased as a source of financing
over the housing cycle. In unreported results we find that 6% of small firms were initially financed
through home equity before 1980; the number increases to 7% during 1980-1989, 7% during 1990-
1999, and 9% from 2000-2002.We take this as initial evidence that the collateral channel may indeed
be an important source of employment during house price booms.
Next, we consider the source of capital after firm establishment: firms are just as likely to rely
on home equity later in the lifecycle. Conditional on receiving additional capital, eleven percent of
firms use home equity financing. The number raises to twenty-two percent among among firms with
$100,000-$250,000 in start-up capital. In our sample we also find that firms that intially raise capital
through home equity are likely to return to home equity loans later in the life cycle: the correlation
between these two decisions is over 50%.
Lastly, we summarize firm and firm owner characteristics by source of financing. We find home
equity financing is most common among (i) firms with involved owners, (ii) owners in middle-age,
and (iii) in the service sector.
First, well over half our sample has only a single owner. The firm is more likely to finance through
home equity if the firm is her principle source of income (13% vs. 10%) and if the owner is also
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the manager (14% vs. 10%). In addition, time at the firm is strongly correlated with home equity.
If the owner spends less than 20 hours a week at the firm, then there is only a 7% probability she
finances through home equity. Instead, 19% of all firms with 60+ owner work weeks finance through
home equity.
Secondly, owner age is an important predictor of home equity financing. Only four percent of
owners under 25 years of age borrow from their home compared to 13% of owners 35-54. The effect
then declines after 55 years of age.
Third, we find that home equity financing is particularly common- 21% to be exact- among firms
in the accomdation and food services sector. The effect is followed by retail trade and transportation
at a substantially smaller 14%. On the other side of the spectrum, we find that among the mining,
professional services, and information sectors only 7% of firms rely on home equity financing.
How do House Prices Impact the Home Equity Channel? We document that local house
price returns over the previous year are highly correlated with home equity financing. In our OLS
regression, we find that a 100% increase in house prices increases home equity by 11% among all
firms. .In addition after including the local demand controls of GDP growth and unemployment
growth, the result still holds. Finally, we also estimate that a 100% increase in price results in a 4%
increase in the probability a firm finances exclusively home equity.
As we have discussed, real estate price growth and firm financing are likely correlated through
time-varying local demand; if GDP and unemployment are not valid proxies of local demand shocks
then this effect may be driving the results. Therefore, we redo the analysis by instrumenting for
exogenous real estate price growth using housing supply elasticity; again the results hold.
One concern with this analysis is our lack of panel-level data; as a result we cannot accept that
unobservable firm fixed effects are driving the results. To overcome the concern we develop a pseudo-
firm for each state and financing cohort, and then complete our analysis again in a panel regression
structure. The holds are similar to the cross-sectional estimates; increasing house prices by 10%
results in an 11% increase in home equity financing and a 6% increases in the chance of financing
entirely through home equity.
To put this in perspective we find the effect of 2000-2006 real estate price growth. First under-
stand that our results are only an underestimate of the true channel since we estimate the effect
relative to firms with minimal financing needs. Since these firms too borrow against home equity,
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we are understating the significance of this channel.
W find that real estate price growth between 2000 and 2006 is responsible for an 6.3% increase
in home-equity financing. Further, for states in the top 10% of real estate price growth this effect
escalates to 14%.
Which Firms are Affected by House Price Shocks? We also check how both firm character-
istics affects our home equity financing results by completing our analysis for each financing cohort.
We that the home equity channel is greatest for financing needs between $25,000 and $1 million.
The effect actually declines slightly with the very largest firms, which is not surprising given that
only 10% of these business relied on home equity.
We find that a 10% increase in house prices results in a 2.1% increase in home equity financing
for firms that receive between a quarter million and a million in initial funds. We redo our analysis
using the panel data and find only larger estimates. Again, to understand the implications, the
result suggest that 1999-2006 house price growth increased home equity financing by 12% in the US
and up to 27% for particularly inelastic states.
The results are smaller for firms with lower financing needs; this should not be surprising given
that most funding comes instead from owners savings and credit cards. Similarly, the largest firms
instead rely on either non-secured bank loans or use alternative sources of collateral (for instance
commercial properties). Still, we find that all firms sizes are positively and significantly affected by
a real estate shock.
Do House Price Shocks Impact Initial Capital Structure? We next test the impact of
house price on alternative financing channels. If entrepreneurs swap home equity financing for more
expensive forms of financing, then we should find that house price growth is negatively associated
with alternative financing, especially more expensive forms of financing. Instead, an insignificant
effect indices that home equity offers the small firm the opportunity to expand since other financing
sources are still present.
Subject to a positive real estate shock, entrepreneurs rely more heavily on home equity and less
on bank loans. Bank loans decline by 1.7% subject to a 10% decline in real estate prices. Other
types of loans- government loans, government guaranteed loans, and family loans- also decling during
housing booms. In comparison, other forms of financing such as credit cards and savings are only
minimally affected by real estate shocks.
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The results imply that in response to house price shock, firms trade home equity loans for more
expensive forms of formal debt. In comparison, equity and informal credit remain at the previous
levels. As a result, we see little effect on the total capital structure of the firm.
One policy implication from this work is the role of governmental loan guarantee programs.
Implicitly, these loans should have the greatest impact when the entreprenuer has limited access
to collateral, such as when house prices are low. Alternatively, if loan guarantee programs are
unaffected by housing shocks, then entreprenuers are either unable or uninterested to access the
support exactly when it is most valuable.
Our analysis supports the intuition that real estate price are negatively correlated with loan
guarantee financing. Doubling house prices decreases the number of new guaranteed loans by 1.2%.
This number differs significantly by the financing needs of the firm: for firms that require $100,000-
$250,000 in funding, this same house price shock decreases the loan quantity by three percent.
What are the Aggregate Effects of the Housing Boom on Entreprenuerial Financing?
As we have already stated, our results imply that between 2000 and 2006 the number of home equity
loans grew 6%. Due to data limitations, it is slightly more difficult to estimate the aggregate the
monetary increase of home equity loans for two reasons. First, we only know whether a firm drew
on a home equity loan, not the amount. To overcome this issue, we assume that the number of
home equity loans is proportional to the total amount of home equity financing; therefore if 10% of
firms depend on a home equity loan then we assume that 10% increase of total financing is through
this funding channel. We believe this is actually an understatement of the true effect since home
equity is a formal financing channel when compared to family loans or credit cards. Secondly, we do
not have data on the exact level of financing for each firm. Therefore as a lower bound, we assume
that firm financing in each cohort is at the lower bound of the financing cohort; this again is an
underestimate since we are substantially underweighting the larger firms that are most dependent
on home equity loans.
We find that 2000-2006 real estate price growth resulted in at least a 9% increase in the total
amount of home equity financing among entreprenuers. In addition, for areas in the top 10% of
house price growth this number reaches over nineteen percent during this same period. The results
highlight the significance of the home equity channel among entreprenuers.
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Conclusion
This purpose of this paper is twofold: (i) determine the extent of home equity financing among
small firms, and (ii) identify when house price shocks can be interpreted as collateral shocks. To
achieve the former we summarize the range of home equity financing among both firm and owner
characteristics using new US small firm data from the Census Survey of Business Owners. To fulfill
the latter goal we evaluate how real estate shocks increase home equity financing in all firms relative
to businesses with minimal financing needs.
According to our analysis home equity is a source of financing for about 15% of large start-ups
(those that received at least $50,000 in initial funding). Secondly, a house price shock does indeed
impact financing: in our preferred specification we find that a 10% increase in real estate price
growth is responsible for an 1.1% increase in home equity financing.
We find two primary implications of our research. First, house price growth does indeed impact
firm financing decisions and is a reasonable measure of liquidity among entreprenuers. In this
way, we validate previous research that has relied on housing shocks to test credit constraints on
entreprenuers.
Secondly, the prevalence of home equity financing combined with swings in the housing sector
suggest the home equity channel on small firms has the potential for sizable effects on the labor
market; given the simultaneous decline in both house prices and small firm financing during the
Great Recession, this remains a significant area of future research.
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5 Conclusion
This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of real estate price fluctuations. Given the
collapse of US house prices during 2007-2009 along with the simultaneous rise in national unem-
ployment we believe that a thorough understanding of both the housing market and its relation to
the macroeconomy has perhaps never been more important. While this dissertation fits in the real
estate finance literature, my broader purpose is to use to new micro-level data to empirically test
the relevance of financial and macroeconomic theories.
My second chapter of my dissertation is titled, How Real Estate Drives the Economy: An
Investigation of Small Firm Collateral Shocks on Employment. The real estate market has been
at the center of the debate on the causes and consequences of the rise in unemployment during
2007-2009, yet the mechanism that links these factors remains inconclusive. We propose a simple
explanation: since small firms are highly dependent on collateral to access external financing, balance
sheet shocks can affect financing availability and impact real outlays. Using UK firm level data we
find that the average small business extracts $0.25 out of every dollar increase in their real estate
value and applies $0.10 for investment and $0.07 for employment expenditures. Our method exploits
cross-sectional differences in exogenous real estate price growth using measures of housing supply
elasticity as well as variation in firm real estate holdings. Our channel directly explains 8-16% of
the decline in national employment during 2007-2009 and as much as 20-37% for areas worst hit
by the housing crisis. The estimates are greatest for both the youngest and smallest firms, and
accounting for general equilibrium effects in a macroeconomic framework appears only to magnify
our result. Our research highlights the small business collateral channel as a relevant explanation
of the recent Great Recession and illustrates business balance sheet shocks as a primary driver of
financial frictions to the economy.
The third chapter of my dissertation is titled, The Effect of Illiquid and Heterogeneous Assets
on Price Index Bias: Evidence from the US Housing Market and attempts to extend empirical
asset pricing techniques to the study of the housing market. Assets such as real estate, large
transportation equipment, and luxury artwork sell infrequently and are not interchangable. As a
result traditional price indices, such as the Case-Shiller Index for metropolitan house prices, are the
dominant method to measure price fluctuations of these heterogeneous and illiquid assets. First,
we highlight that standard price indices are biased towards frequently sold assets and can result
in significant financial implications. Secondly, we correct for this mismeasurment by introducing
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the locally-weighted repeated sales technique, a novel estimation procedure for estimating a distinct
price index for any asset and then aggregating assets to define unbiased indices. Our procedure rests
on estimating local weights by comparing a given assets to all similar assets sold that period along a
number of observable characteristics. Third, we highlight advantage of our technique by examining
the US housing market. We find that beginning in 2004 changing credit standards to low income
homebuyers resulted in strong price growth and high turnover in low value housing. As a result a
Case-Shiller type index substantially overstates the peak of the US housing bubble by 10%.
In the fourth and final chapter, titled Do Real Estate Prices Impact Entrepreneurial Financing?
Evidence from the Home Equity Channel, we examine the use of home equity for small businesses
and the effect of real estate price growth on entrepreneurial financing. Using a new micro-level
dataset, we find that during the housing boom one-quarter of large US start-ups depended on home
equity as a source of initial capital. In response to an exogenous shock to real estate price growth,
entrepreneurs increase reliance on home equity financing relative to firms with minimal financing
needs. Simultaneously, these firms decline financing through bank loans while less formal financing
channels appear unaffected. The results are greatest for firms that receive between $50,000, and
$1 million in funding. Specifically, in our preferred specification we find that a 100% increase in
real estate price growth is responsible for an 11% increase in home equity financing among all
entrepreneurs and a 21% increase for large start-ups. Using a simple back of the envelop calculation
we find that 2000-2006 real estate price growth is responsible for at least a 9% increase in the level
of initial funding through the home equity channel.
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